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ABSTRACT 
Oil and gas condition monitoring systems play a major role in maintaining the operability, 
integrity, and reliability of oil and gas infrastructure. A leak detection monitoring system 
(LDS) constitutes an important member of these systems. The main function of this system 
is to detect the occurrence and location of hydrocarbon leakages in a timely manner before 
the leaked products can cause a devastating effect on production, health, safety, and the 
environment. To ensure the continuity of operation and the safety of personnel as well as 
the environment, this system should be assessed on a regular basis. Traditionally, a 
deterministic approach is adopted to assess such systems. A deterministic assessment does 
not consider   uncertainties or  random variabilities   that are inherent in   the performance 
parameters. Thus, it produces   results that may not characterize the actual situation of the 
system or its circumstances. To tackle this issue, it is proposed to use a probabilistic 
approach to assess the performance since it allows the incorporation of any uncertainties 
or random variabilities that may exist in the assessment. Hence, a quantifiable probability 
of failure can be estimated. Once the probability and consequences of failure become 
known, risk can be easily estimated. 
 
A complete assessment of risk cannot by obtained without incorporating the probability of 
failure of the pipeline itself.   The major research activities include, formulation of the LDS 
probability of detection and false detection for a single point along the oil and gas transport 
component; development of a probabilistic performance assessment scheme for the entire 
LDS along the oil and gas transport component using a limit-state approach; application 
ii 
of probabilistic methods to determine the probability of failure and the remaining life of 
the oil and gas transport component and development of a risk-based assessment 
methodology to determine the risk associated with the simultaneous failure of the LDS 
and the oil and gas transport component (i.e., pipelines). These major research components 
establish the foundation for an overall evaluation scheme that can be used to provide an 
up-to-date assessment of the oil and gas transport components and the LDS. The outcome 
of the assessment can serve as a basis for a well-informed decision-making process that 
enables the decision makers to determine the best strategy   for assessing and maintaining 
the integrity of the evaluated systems. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As industrial systems age, they will eventually degrade in performance leading to partial 
or complete failure. Failure of a system may adversely affect its production, the 
environment, and the reputation of its owner. The consequences of such failure may include 
loss of production and environmental damage. More importantly, safety of operators and 
credibility of the company might be jeopardized. All of these consequences may entail 
financial losses and liabilities.   
 
To maintain competitiveness and survivability in the market, companies must adopt the 
best and most effective approach to assess the integrity of their assets in a timely and 
structured fashion using the best available tools. Companies must strive to maintain 
optimum performance of their assets and minimize consequences of their failures. Among 
the critical industrial infrastructures are oil and gas transport systems. The conditions of 
these systems must be monitored regularly to ensure that their integrity is maintained and 
that there is no risk to the environment. Being underwater, such systems may pose threats 
to the surrounding habitats if the system fails to function in a safe manner.  
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One of the most important tools used for monitoring pipelines is the Leak Detection System 
(LDS). Selecting an appropriate LDS to work in harsh and aggressive environments, such 
as underwater, is a very challenging task.  
 
All the factors that influence the LDS operation performance including environmental 
impact, impact of the auxiliary systems, probabilistic nature of the factors, sensitivity of 
the measuring components, and variability and fluctuation in measurements must be 
considered in selecting the best LDS for subsea operation. 
 
The performance of the LDS and its associated components should be assessed regularly 
to determine if the system is safe to operate. Based on the outcome of the assessment, a 
decision can be made if the whole system or a component of the system needs to be 
repaired, upgraded, or replaced.  
 
Current practices use deterministic approaches for assessing the performance of these 
systems. A deterministic approach does not consider the random variability and uncertainty 
associated with the degradation and the assessment models. The deterministic assessment 
may provide conservative results in the event the upper limits of the performance 
parameters are used or an underestimated outcome in the event the lower limits are used. 
A deterministic approach may also produce partial assessments that may not truly 
characterize the actual condition of the system, which may eventually lead to poor 
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decisions. To deal with these issues, a probability-based approach should be implemented 
to assess the performance of the LDS. Adopting this approach allows the incorporation of 
uncertainties and random variability into the assessment. Thus, a quantifiable probability 
of failure can be estimated. 
  
Similarly, the performance assessment of the LDS in conjunction with a probabilistic 
assessment of the oil and gas transport component should also be used. There are codes 
and standards that can be used to assess corroded pipelines, but these codes and standards 
are based on deterministic methods and exclude condition monitoring systems such as LDS 
from the assessment and only focus on pipelines. In order to provide a reliable and inclusive 
assessment of the integrity of the pipeline and its LDS, a probabilistic approach, by 
providing joint probabilistic assessment, should be used. Adopting this approach will 
provide a realistic assessment that better describes the actual condition of the system being 
evaluated. Additionally, it will enable evaluators to correctly determine if the systems are 
operating in a safe and reliable manner. 
 
1.2 LDS FAILURE  
 
Generally, the key factors that affect the performance of a leak detection system are missed 
detection and false detection. The system may reveal that a leak is happening somewhere 
along the pipeline when in fact there is no leak present (this is termed a false detection or 
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false alarm). Likewise, the system may not declare a leak is happening when in fact it is 
present (this is termed a missed detection). Missed or false detections may not completely 
place the system out of service; however, they cause the system to fail partially. In either 
case, whether there is total or partial failure, the performance of the system will be in 
jeopardy. Once we know of these failures and are able to calculate the probability of their 
occurrences and their consequences, we can evaluate the risk and its impact on the 
environment and production.  
 
1.3 PIPELINE FAILURE  
 
Pipeline failure events consist of a leak or rupture of the pipe; the failure modes are the 
degradation mechanisms, i.e., corrosion, cracks, or other flaws. Uncertainty in the collected 
inspection data, pipeline geometry, pipeline material properties, and operating 
characteristics present a great challenge to the analysis.  A probability-based assessment 
approach should be adopted as it is the best suited to deal with uncertainty, where a 
quantifiable value of the probability of failure can be estimated (Lindley, 1982). 
Probabilistic methods can be used for assessing the current and future ability of pipelines 
to support operational demand without jeopardizing safety and reliability. Based on the 
outcome of the assessment, the pipeline fitness for service as well as the remaining life can 
be determined. 
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The probability of failure is estimated by probabilistic modeling in terms of the failure 
modes where uncertainty is included in the estimation. The Monte Carlo simulation method 
is used to evaluate the probabilistic characteristics of the random variables and then 
determine the probability of failure, either by sample statistics or by counting methods 
(Haldar & Mahadevan, 2000).  
 
1.4 RISK ASSESSMENT  
 
Two fundamental components establish the risk assessment, as illustrated in Figure 1.1: 
the probability and consequences of failure for both the pipeline and the LDS.  
 
Figure 1-1 Failure and Its Consequences 
 
The figure indicates that in order to know the risk, the probability of failure (Pof) and 
consequences of failure (Cof), which incorporate environmental as well as economic 
consequences, should be known beforehand. The pipeline fails to operate safely due to 
rupture or leakage caused by excessive corrosion or cracking. Obviously, the leaked 
product will damage the surrounding environment and the problem becomes worse if the 
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LDS fails to detect this failure in time. The LDS failure and the pipeline failure events are 
independent, and as such the probability of their occurrence at the same time is the product 
of both probabilities.  
 
1.5  RESEARCH SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES  
 
This research explores, investigates, and establishes a probabilistic assessment framework 
for oil and gas pipeline condition monitoring systems. Engineering probabilistic methods, 
concepts of signal detection theory, and concepts of distributed fiber optic sensing will be 
applied and adopted as appropriate. The scope of the research is broken down into four 
major tasks that represent the building blocks for the overall framework. 
 
1. Formulation of the probability of detection and false detection for fiber-optic-
based LDS. 
2. Development of a probabilistic performance assessment scheme for fiber-optic-
based LDS. 
3. Application of probabilistic methods for assessing the integrity and determining 
the probability of failure as well as the remaining life of oil and gas transport 
components (i.e., pipelines). 
4. Development of a risk-based assessment methodology to determine the risk 
associated with the simultaneous failure of the LDS and the oil and gas transport 
components (i.e., pipelines). 
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1.6  RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS  
 
 The research is based on the following general assumptions: 
 Power signal and noise power signal are assumed to follow normal distribution. 
 The mean of the noise power signal is assumed to be zero. 
 The time required to process the data contained in the signal by the system are 
assumed to follow normal distribution.    
 The power represents the true temperature measurements and noise represents 
the measurement error. 
 The probability of detection, probability of delayed detection, or probability of 
false alarm is computed as   per-single LDS segment. 
 The threshold represents the minimum detectable temperature change that can be 
detected by the LDS. It is assumed that it is a given parameter as part of the 
specification of the system. If this parameter is not given, then the probability of 
false detection (probability of false alarm) should be a given parameter as per the 
specification. 
 The capacity as well as the load of the limit state functions addressed in the 
research are assumed to be random. 
 The fiber-optic response time to temperature change is in the nanoseconds range 
and can be ignored.   
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 The failure of the entire LDS along the pipeline is assumed to be a series system 
and the failure of each LDS segment is independent.  
 The failure of the LDS is the event that it misses the detection of an actual leak.   
 
1.7 RATIONALE 
 
LDS is one of the critical condition monitoring systems of the entire oil and gas 
infrastructure. The failure of the LDS to detect an actual oil or gas leak, whether sudden or 
gradual, has drastic effects on the environment, production, as well as safety, and 
jeopardizes the survivability of the operating company in the market. Similarly, the 
incorrect declaration of a leak by the LDS, i.e., providing a false alarm, will result in 
deploying all the necessary equipment and personnel to the pipeline site that is thought to 
be leaking, which will result in great losses in time and money. This is the reason for 
focusing on the LDS. 
 
There are various types of LDS that use different technologies, but one of these 
technologies that is gaining wide acceptance in the industry is the fiber-optic leak detection 
system. This emerging and promising technology has great potential for oil and gas 
condition monitoring applications. It is the most suited for underwater applications due to 
the ease of installation and reliable sensing capabilities. This technology relies on 
distributed sensing techniques, where the fiber optic cable acts as a large sensor that 
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provides sensing capabilities in a timely and cost-effective manner. Moreover, increased 
temperature accuracy and spatial resolution are achieved when using this technology. It is 
immune to electromagnetic interference, unaffected by corrosion, and easier to install along 
or on the pipeline. 
 
Current codes and standards, industry practices, and literature exclude condition 
monitoring systems from the assessment process. At every instant of time, each defect point 
along the pipeline is subject to two undesirable events: the pressure failure that may take 
place causing a leak or rupture due to the weakness of the defective point to resist the 
internal pressure (load) imposed on it; and the inability of the LDS to detect the leakage at 
the defective point. Therefore, to achieve a comprehensive and precise assessment, the 
LDS and the pipeline should be evaluated jointly.  
  
An integrated probabilistic approach for assessing the integrity of a corroded oil and gas 
pipeline and LDS should be developed. This is a joint probability of failure function for 
both the pipeline and the LDS. It encompasses the failure pressure and the detection failure 
only and does not include the false detection (false alarm). The probability of false alarm 
is evaluated separately since the consequences of detection failure are different from the 
consequences of false alarm. It should be noted that the detection failure will only occur if 
a leak is present along the pipeline, whereas false detection occurs when a leak is not 
present.  
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In light of the above, the focus of the scope will be on a condition monitoring system that 
monitors and reports hydrocarbon leakage only. The scope will be limited to fiber-optic-
based LDS. Among the different fiber-optic distributed sensing techniques, the scope will 
be limited to what is called Brillouin Optical Domain Analysis (BOTDA) (Soto, Bolognini, 
& Pasquale, 2011).   
 
1.8 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS  
 
Chapter 2 summarizes the literature review and presents background information related 
to the research. Chapter 3 discusses the formulation and analysis of the probability of 
detection and false detection for fiber-optic-based LDS. The emphasis is on the LDS at a 
single segment of the pipeline and is not for the entire LDS along the pipeline. Chapter 4 
presents a probabilistic performance assessment scheme based on limit state approach for 
the entire fiber-optic LDS along the pipeline. The threshold and the probability of false 
alarm (PFA) (the outcome of chapter 3) are used to perform the assessment. The 
probabilistic assessment outcome includes the probability of failure for the entire LDS 
along the pipeline. The probability of failure encompasses detection failure and false 
detection. Detection failure is the combination of missed detection and delayed detection. 
Essentially, it determines the overall probability of failure of the entire LDS along the 
pipeline. Chapter 5 presents a methodology for assessing the condition of corroded 
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pipelines by calculating the pipeline probability of failure using limit state approach and 
pressure failure models, as recommended by internationally recognized codes and 
standards. The outcome of the assessment can be used to determine the pipeline fitness for 
service and its remaining life. Chapter 6 presents an integrated risk assessment approach 
of the pipeline failure due to burst and LDS failure due to missed detection. The outcome 
of chapters 3 and 5 are used to conduct the risk-based assessment. This approach can be 
used to predict and quantify the future financial impact in the event a pipeline and condition 
monitoring system (i.e., LDS) fail. The assessment provides the expected level of risk 
expressed in monetary value. Chapter 7 provides a risk-based assessment methodology to 
assess the simultaneous failure of the LDS and the pipeline due to leakage and rupture. 
Chapter 8 provides summary and concluding remarks and chapter 9 summarizes the 
research contributions and recommendations for future research.  
  
12 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
The literature review focuses on the monitoring function of subsea oil and gas 
infrastructure. Mainly, there are four monitoring functions that fall under the category of 
integrity monitoring processes. These are the monitoring functions for downhole 
(equipment that is used in the well), wellhead gathering/manifold, seabed 
processing/pumping, and transportation pipeline (Ogwude, 2003). The research will focus 
on the monitoring function for transporting oil and gas pipelines, which is the leak detection 
function.  
 
The following paragraphs summarize the latest work that has been accomplished in the 
area of leak detection. Only common leak detection techniques are discussed. This chapter 
starts by providing a description of generic reporting systems (in section 2.1), followed by 
information about common LDS (sections 2.2-2.4). Finally, section 2.5 discusses fiber-
optic distributed sensing, and section 2.6 provides an overview of failure modeling using 
limit state functions.  
 
2.1 INTEGRITY MONITORING AND REPORTING 
 
A generic system that performs an integrity monitoring and reporting function is illustrated 
in Figure 1. The monitoring and sensing functions are performed by the sensors attached 
to the object. The data collection is then performed jointly by the sensors, which convey 
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the data to the communications network, which sends the data to the control room to be 
analyzed in order to determine if a leak has occurred or not. 
 
Figure 2-1: Generic Monitoring and Reporting System 
 
A more detailed representation of the diagram shown in Figure 2.1 is depicted in Figure 
2.2. The system mainly consists of three subsystems that perform the monitoring, reporting, 
data analysis, and decision-making functions. The leak detectors perform the monitoring 
function; the fiber-optic or wireless communications systems perform the reporting 
function; software applications residing in the main computer at the land or offshore 
processing facility perform the data analysis and decision-making function.  
 
14 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Typical Leak Monitoring and Reporting System 
  
 
2.2 COMMON LEAK DETECTION TECHNIQUES  
 
Commonly used leak detection methods include pressure monitoring, volume balance, 
negative pressure wave, model-based, fiber-optic, statistical, and transient methods. In the 
literature, leak detection methods are classified by either internal or external, or hardware-
based or software-based methods. The following classification will consist of internal- and 
external-based methods. One of the promising external-based methods is the fiber-optic 
sensing, which will be discussed separately. 
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2.3 INTERNAL LEAK DETECTION METHODS 
 
Pressure Point Analysis (PPA) 
The pressure point analysis technique performs monitoring function by comparing the 
pipeline pressure at predetermined points with a statistical trend established for prior 
pressure measurements (Akib, Saad, & Asirvadam, 2011; Wan et al., 2012). The main 
advantage of this method is that leaks can be detected easily, while the major drawback is 
that the leaks cannot be located easily. Furthermore, performance is poor in multiphase 
flowlines, transient conditions, slack lines, etc.  
 
One method that falls under this category is the FFT-based Algorithm Improvements for 
Detecting Leakage in Pipelines. Lay-Ekuakille, Vedramin and Trotta (2009) applied this 
method on a group of pipes placed in a zigzag manner, where several valves were installed 
and five leak points were established along the pipe. The frequency versus amplitude 
curves can be used to determine if a leak has occurred or not. The valves of the pipes were 
opened and then closed during the testing to simulate the drop in pressure; these pressure 
drops or discrepancies indicate the existence of a leak. The experiment was implemented 
in a stress-free environment, i.e. the pipeline was not buried or placed in   an underwater 
environment. It is not clear if the plots provided can locate or quantify the leaks. There was 
no mention of the minimum detectable leak rate.  
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Volume Balance / Mass Balance  
The volume balance method works by balancing the volume of the fluid at the inlet with 
that of the outlet against the mass inventory of the pipeline; any deviation would indicate 
a leak. The volume or the mass of the fluid can be approximated by calculating the state of 
variables, temperature, pressure, and flow rate. This method has the ability to detect leaks 
resulting from progressive crack or corrosion growth and leaks that are accidental. This 
system requires flow meters at the downstream and upstream of the pipeline in addition to 
pressure and temperature sensors located in between. The main advantages of this method 
are the accurate prediction of the leak flow rate, the ability to detect progressive leaks, and 
that it is a proven technology. It performs very well in oil lines and can detect large leaks 
easily. This method takes longer time to detect   and does not accurately locate a leak.    It 
does not perform very well in detecting small crude oil leaks. Moreover, it does not perform 
very well in gas pipelines. The longer detection time, if looked at from a different 
perspective, becomes an advantage of the system, as the longer response time will give 
assurances that there is in fact a leak, which will in the end prevent false detection (Martins 
& Seleghim, 2010).  
 
Negative Pressure Wave  
Negative pressure method detects sudden leaks that may result from accidental impacts 
caused by an object or from abrupt pipeline failure due to neglected cracks or corrosion. 
Upon the occurrence of a leak, two negative pressure waves will travel from the leak 
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location in opposite directions with the speed of sound of the fluid towards the ends of the 
pipeline or pipeline segment. The leak location can be determined by calculating and 
comparing the time of arrival of the two waves at each end. This method is fairly simple 
and does not require complex mathematical models for predicting a leak. The main 
advantage of this method is the accurate and quick prediction of the leak and its position. 
The main disadvantage is the inability to detect progressive leaks (Martins & Seleghim, 
2010; Ge, Wang, & Ye, 2008).  
 
 
Hierarchical Leak Detection and Localization Methods  
Hierarchical leak detection and localization methods for gas pipelines are based on wavelet 
transforms and multi-classifier Support Vector Machine (SVM) (Wan et al., 2012). This 
method is implemented by applying a bilinear search method to determine the optimal 
parameters and sigmoid function to convert the results obtained from the recognition done 
by the SVM to probability estimates. For locating the leak, the principle of time difference 
of arrival is used. Essentially, the purpose for using the wavelet transform is to remove 
noise and dispersion from the propagating signal along the pipe; then the signal is broken 
down into smaller portions to obtain the characteristics of the leak. Concerning the method 
developed under this research, it is not clear if the pipeline was tested under water, buried, 
or aboveground. The proposed method adopts so many mathematical and analytical tools 
that make the use of this method complicated and time consuming. There is therefore a 
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need to develop a technique that minimizes the time and effort in performing the detection 
and analyses of leaks, should they occur, to make it more attractive and worth considering. 
 
Expert System Methods 
Xu et al. (2007) studied belief-rule-based expert system to detect and quantify pipeline 
leaks. The system used different pipeline operating conditions, and based on the pipeline 
operation pattern the leaks can be detected. The belief-rule-based expert system was based 
on the mass-balance method. When a leak develops along the pipeline, the pressure will 
change and adopt certain patterns that are different from normal operation patterns. Experts 
can determine the patterns for each situation, leak or no leak. Along the way, relationships 
were established between the leak sizes and the pipeline pressure measurements and flow 
rates. These relationships are essential components for the belief-rule-based system. The 
method requires prior knowledge about the pipeline’s normal operation to establish these 
relationships between pressure, flow rates, and leak sizes. Human judgments are subjective 
and could lead to erroneous information. It is not clear if the pipeline was underground or 
buried.  
  
 
Real Time Transient Methods (RTTM) 
RTTM works by using conservation of mass, conservation of momentum and energy 
principles, and the equation of state for the fluid. Sensors located along the pipeline 
measure flow, pressure, density, and temperature. The measurement data are sent to the 
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processing computer for analysis and any deviation between the measured values and the 
predicted values indicates that a leak is happening. This method requires a lot of 
instrumentation to collect data in real time and is expensive to implement as it is 
complicated and requires extensive training. The next few paragraphs discuss the advances 
related to transient method. Leak detection based on this method can detect leaks accurately 
up to and below 1% and performs extremely well in large and long pipelines.  
 
Model-based pipeline monitoring uses hyperbolic partial differential equations to detect oil 
and gas pipeline leaks (Hauge, Aamo, & Godhavn, 2009). The system consisted of a 
Luenberges observer and Heuristic update laws. The system considered only the inlet and 
outlet of the pipe as data collection points, and the data of concern were the flow rate and 
pressure. The Luenberges observer relies on flow condition by using hyperbolic differential 
equations to describe the flow condition.  
 
Heuristic update laws were used for adjustment of the leak time varying parameters. The 
model was verified by simulation and proved to be capable of detecting, locating, and 
quantifying pipeline leaks under transient conditions. The assumption was that a leak is a 
time-varying incident because leaks vary during shutdown of the pipe (therefore a leak is 
not constant).  
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The lumped parameters model was used for detecting and locating leaks along the pipe 
using static and dynamic behaviors of the flow (Daneti, 2010). The developed model was 
verified experimentally where the measuring points located at an interval of 0.3 meters 
along a 12.8-meter pipe. The received signal plus noise originating from leak points were 
analyzed using a Matlab Simulink environment.  
 
Leak detection in pipes using transient flow and genetic algorithm is a method that can 
detect leaks coming out from a water pipeline (Kim, Miyazaki, & Tsukamoto, 2008). Under 
this method, the transient pressure analyses along with the genetic algorithm were used to 
determine the location of a leak. The work carried out in this paper was based on the 
assumption that the leak in the pipe contributes to the attenuation of the transient pressure 
waves. A case study was presented for a 100-meter pipe with three conditions: one leak, 
two leaks, one leak and noise. The friction factor played a major role in determining the 
leak location. It was concluded from the case study that a linear relationship existed 
between the friction factor and the leak location. Moreover, leak detection with noisy 
signals was also possible where the noise was modeled with zero mean and random 
deviation of ± 0.5 m added to the reference pressure.  
 
Leak detection in pipe networks using coded transients is one of the methods used to detect 
and locate leaks, where a linear analytical solution was developed and Fourier series 
solution applied as an analytical method (Wang, Simpson, & Lambert, 2006). The work 
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resulted in what is called coded transients. The authors studied the influence of leaks on 
transient events. A reduction in the amplitude of the signal would indicate the existence of 
a leak. A comparison study was done between the Method of Characteristic (MOC) and 
the developed analytical solution, resulted in accurate results for the two conditions (no 
leak and leak). Also, it was shown that the leaks influenced only the amplitude of resonant 
transients, and the amplitude was expressed as a function of frequency. The whole study 
resulted in developing a method to detect, locate, and quantify the leak. 
  
Leak detection in pipes by frequency response method using step excitation is another 
method based on transient analysis that takes pressure variation into consideration in the 
analysis to determine if a leak has occurred along the pipe (Mpesha, Chaudhry, Kahn, & 
Gassman, 2002). The frequency responses were analyzed using Fast Fourier Transforms to 
detect, locate, and quantify leaks. The analysis was performed by comparing the frequency 
responses of no leak with that of a leak. Different piping systems and different 
configurations with different number of leaks were experimented with (one leak, multiple 
leaks, parallel piping system, branched piping system with one leak, and multiple leaks 
were tested). The experiment was conducted by taking the pressure and discharge readings 
as the valve was opened and closed gradually to simulate the leak situation, which is a 
change of the behavior of the pipes’ operating conditions. The no-leak signals showed only 
primary amplitude peaks while the leak signals showed additional secondary amplitude 
peaks to indicate that a leak had occurred. The difference between the two responses in 
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terms of amplitude was used to determine the location of the leak. The experiment was 
conducted in open-air environment and the plots presented several smaller peaks, which 
might be confused with leak signals.   
 
The challenge for internal LDS is mainly the detection of small chronic leaks at start up, 
shut down, valve closures, transient flow, slack lines, etc. 
 
 
2.4 EXTERNAL LEAK DETECTION METHODS 
 
Acoustic Emission 
Acoustic emission technique for detecting and locating leaks was experimentally 
investigated by Xiang, Fang, and Lu (2011). The leak was observed by variation in pressure 
while the location of the leak was determined by using wavelet transforms. A leak can be 
determined based on the signal shape and variations. Wavelet transforms used to de-noise 
the signal and cross-correlation method were used to determine the location of the signal. 
It is not clear from the paper if the experiment was conducted in a lab environment or in 
the field. There is no indication if the pipeline was buried, above ground, or underwater.   
 
Fiber Optic Leak Detection Methods 
The fiber optic method identifies leaks when a change in temperature of the surrounding 
environment takes place or when a micro bend in the cable occurs.  
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2.5 FIBER OPTIC DISTRIBUTED SENSING   
   
Fiber optic distributed sensing is one of the   promising technologies   that can perform 
continuous sensing along the entire length of the monitored object, i.e., pipeline. By using 
fiber optic distributed sensing technology, the vibration, strain, and temperature changes 
along the monitored object can be detected. Strain occurring on a pipeline can indicate the 
existence of cracks, and detecting it in advance will provide ample time to perform 
corrective action before the crack can cause structural failure that may lead to a leak and 
eventually oil spill, causing environmental damage. The same fiber optic cable used for 
sensing can be used to support pipeline telecommunications requirements along the 
pipeline via another dedicated fiber strand (Bao & Chen, 2012).   
 
 Leaked crude oil will   increase the temperature of the surrounding area; this increase in 
temperature will cause scattering of the light wave to indicate the occurrence of a leak as 
indicated in Figure 2.3 (Nikles, 2009).  
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Figure 2-3: Distance versus Temperature for Leaking Oil Pipeline 
 
  
 
Leaked gasses will decrease the temperature of the surrounding area as indicated in Figure 
2.4 resulting in alarm indicating a gas leak (Nikles, 2009).   
 
 
Figure 2-4: Distance versus Temperature for Leaking Gas Pipeline 
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2.5.1 Distributed Sensing  
Implementing point sensing will require hundreds if not thousands of sensors to be 
mounted on the pipeline to be monitored, which makes such an endeavor difficult to 
implement and costly (and at times impossible). On the other hand, distributed sensing 
enables the fiber optic cable to function as a sensor providing sensing capabilities in a 
timely and cost-effective manner. Moreover, increased temperature accuracy and spatial 
resolution are achieved. When an optical laser propagates through the fiber, it gets scattered 
back in three different spectral forms with different frequencies:  
1. Rayleigh  
2.  Raman  
3. Brillouin scattering  
 
The thing that distinguishes one form of scattering from the other is the wavelength 
characteristic (shown in Figure 2.5). Rayleigh scattering remains at the same wavelength 
as the source light and the other two scatterings shift for a certain wavelength. All three 
have been employed in the distributed sensing technology. 
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Figure 2-5: Scattering Spectrum 
  
 
Rayleigh scattering is linear and used for distributed acoustic sensing; it is called elastic 
scattering because the scattering does not experience any frequency change. It is created 
due to the interaction of the photon particles that were emitted by the source with the 
molecules of the fiber materials (Bao & Chen, 2012).  
 
The other two scattering mechanisms are nonlinear and are called inelastic as they 
experience frequency change, where the scattered power is expressed as a fraction of the 
incident power. The spectrum to the right side of Rayleigh is called stoke spectrum, and 
the one on the other side is called anti-stoke peak. As Figure 2.5 indicates, the Raman 
spectrum consists of two components: the temperature-dependent anti-stoke Raman 
component and the temperature-independent stoke Raman component. The Raman 
scattering can be used for temperature sensing where ratio of the stoke and anti-stoke light 
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Stoke 
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intensity is used for determining the temperature at the point where the light is scattered 
back to the source.  
 
Brillouin scattering is used to sense strain and temperature changes, which can be 
determined from changes in the wavelength. The scattering occurs when the laser (the 
incident light) interacts with the phonons and incident laser light is split into scattered 
photon (light particles) and phonon (acoustic or vibration energy). The scattered light 
creates wavelength shift or frequency shift, which can be used to measure local strain or 
temperature changes. 
 
2.5.2  TECHNOLOGIES 
Distributed Temperature Sensing (DTS) 
Raman and Brillouin scattering can be used to sense and detect temperature change. During 
a leak incident, the temperature of the local region surrounding the leak will change and 
from time of arrival of the backscattered light the location of the leak can be determined. 
The change of light intensity will indicate a change of temperature for systems that are 
based on Raman scattering. While in the case of a Brillouin-based system, a change of 
frequency or wavelength will indicate a change of temperature and strain.   
 
Brillouin-based systems are more favorable than Raman-based systems for long-haul 
pipelines because the light can go longer distances without the need for regenerating or 
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amplifying the signal. Moreover, Brillouin-based sensing can sense temperature and strain 
at the same time. 
 
Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) 
DAS is used to detect acoustic emissions in which the fiber optic will detect the vibration 
along the pipeline. If this vibration event is distinct and different than the normal low-level 
vibration activities and related to a leak, the sensing cable will detect it and trigger an 
alarm. This technology uses Rayleigh band to detect change of acoustic energy by the 
change of the signal intensity. It can be used to detect leaks, sabotage activities, and any 
other disruption activities, since the only element that is monitored is the sound coming 
from the pipe (Eisler & Lanan, 2012).   
  
Distributed Strain Sensing (DSS) 
The extent of strain and the change of temperature of the area around the pipe can be 
determined by using the Brillouin backscattered light from where the frequency change has 
occurred. Brillouin-based scattering has the advantage over other methods for its ability to 
perform sensing and detection of longer-range pipes. It has the ability to measure 
temperature and strain with high sensitivity and accuracy. The measurement here is based 
on Brillouin; the temperature and strain measurements can be determined from the 
frequency shift of the Brillouin band, which is different from the Raman case where the 
measurement is based on the power measurements. 
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Other Brillouin-sensing-based techniques cited in the literature that can provide 
temperature and strain sensing include Differential Pulse-Width Pair Brillouin Optical 
Time Domain Analysis (DPP-BOTDA); Brillouin Optical Time Domain Reflectometry 
(BOTDR) (Bao & Chen, 2012; Li et al., 2008); and Brillouin Grating (Song, Zou, He, & 
Hotate, 2008). These methods have different sensing range, measurement time, 
temperature and strain accuracies, and spatial resolution. Of these techniques, DPP-
BOTDA performs the best in terms of sensing range and accuracy.  
 
2.5.3  OVERVIEW OF DISTRIBUTED SENSING AND FIBER- OPTIC- BASED 
LDS 
 
Fiber optic distributed sensing can perform continuous sensing along the monitored object, 
which enables the system to provide early warnings of any abnormalities that may occur.  
One of the technologies based on distributed fiber optic sensing is the fiber-optic-based 
LDS. One of the distributed sensing techniques is the Brillouin Optical Time Domain 
Analysis (BOTDA), (Soto et al., Bolognini,   and Pasquale, 2011), which   is the focus of 
this   research. It is widely used by the industry for condition monitoring and reporting.  
 
 
2.6  MODELING FAILURE 
 
The parameters that influence the performance of the system during operation vary from 
time to time. The capacity is a design parameter that dictates the system’s ability to deliver 
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and it is assumed to be probabilistic.   Using the same argument, the load of the system is 
also assumed to be probabilistic.   
 
𝑃( 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒) = 𝑃(𝐶 < 𝐿)                                                                              (2.4) 
 
Where L is the load and C is the capacity or resistance of the system. Equation. 2.4 
expresses the fact that the probability of failure is a conditional probability and 
encompasses all possible combinations of L = x and C < L; x is a specified limit value that 
the load should not exceed, (Nowak and & Collins, (2000)).   
  
  
         
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3  
FORMULATION OF THE PROBABILITY OF DETECTION AND 
FALSE DETECTION FOR LEAK DETECTION SYSTEMS 
 
 
Ensuring the integrity of subsea process components is one of the primary business 
objectives of the oil and gas industry. Leak detection system (LDS) is one type of systems 
that is used to safeguard reliability of a pipeline. Different types of LDS use different 
technologies for detecting and locating leaks in pipelines.  Fiber optic based LDS is gaining 
wide acceptance by the industry and has great potential for subsea pipeline applications.  
 
It is the most suited for underwater applications due to the ease of installation and reliable 
sensing capabilities. Having pipelines underwater in the deep sea presents a great challenge 
and a potential threat to the environment and operation. Thus, there is a need to have a 
reliable and effective system to provide assurances that the monitored subsea pipeline is 
safe and functioning as per operating conditions. Two important performance parameters 
that are of concern to operators are the probability of detection (PD) and probability of 
false alarm (PFA).  
 
There is no established method for evaluating the PD and PFA for a fiber-optic-based LDS. 
False detection results in excessive expenditure and unnecessary mobilization of 
equipment and personnel to the site that is thought to be leaking. On the other hand, missed 
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detection results in environmental and financial liabilities and unfavorable impacts on 
reputation.   
 
The main objective of this chapter is to formulate the PD and PFA for a fiber optic 
distributed sensing technique used for leak detection. This is accomplished by adopting 
some concepts from signal detection theory (SDT) and engineering probabilistic methods.   
Once the threshold becomes known, the PFA can be determined by expressing the PFA in 
terms of the threshold. In addition, PD can be determined in terms of the PFA. The 
emphasis of this chapter is on the LDS at a single segment of the pipeline and not for the 
entire LDS along the pipeline. Fiber optic distributed sensing techniques and some 
concepts from signal detection theory are used to formulate the PFA and the threshold. 
Matlab is the programing tool used to perform the analysis.   
 
 
3.1  LEAK DETECTION SYSTEMS  
 
One of the key monitoring systems for subsea pipelines is the LDS. Its performance should 
be assessed regularly to ensure that its operability and functionality as well as its reliability 
are maintained at all times and more importantly to ensure that it does not miss detection 
of or falsely detect a pipeline leak. The consequences of such an incorrect diagnosis may 
pose a threat to the environment or production. Based on the outcome of the assessment, a 
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decision should be made if the whole or part of the system needs to be repaired, upgraded, 
or replaced.  
 
 Missed detection and false detection are key factors that generally affect   the performance 
of a subsea LDS. The system may declare the occurrence of a leak when in fact a leak is 
not present.   Similarly, the system may not reveal that a leak is happening when in fact it 
is happening. The latter scenario is termed a missed detection, and the former is termed a 
false detection or false alarm. Missed or false detection may not completely place the 
system out of service; however, they cause the system to fail partially. In either case, 
whether we have total or partial failure, the performance of the system will be in jeopardy. 
Once we know these failures and are able to calculate the probability of their occurrences 
and their consequences, we can evaluate the risk and its impact on the environment and 
production.   
 
Regardless of which leak detection method is used, the characteristics of the received signal 
are what allow us to determine the status of the pipeline. All leak detection methods or 
systems have one common task: to detect and declare if a leak has or has not occurred and, 
based on the characteristics of the received signal, determine the quantity and location of 
the hydrocarbon leak.  
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3.2  FIBER-OPTIC-BASED LDS 
 
One of the most promising condition-monitoring technologies is the fiber optic distributed 
sensing, which can perform ongoing sensing along the entire length of the monitored 
structure. The fiber optic components act as a sensor, providing sensing and prior warning 
capabilities in real time and on a continuous basis. By using distributed fiber optic sensing 
technology, the vibration, strain, and temperature changes along the monitored object can 
be detected. Strain occurring on a pipeline may give indication of the existence of cracks, 
and detecting them in advance will enable maintenance personnel to perform corrective 
actions in a timely manner. Applying this technology will prevent structural failure that 
could lead to a leak and eventually to an oil spill. The same fiber optic cable used for 
sensing can be used to support the pipeline’s telecommunications requirements along the 
pipeline via another dedicated fiber strand.   
 
Generally, oil is transported through pipes at a temperature that is higher than its 
surroundings. In the event a leak happens, the temperature of the surroundings will 
increase, causing a portion of the light wave to scatter back to the source, indicating the 
occurrence of a leak (Nikles, 2009). On the other hand, when a gas pipeline starts leaking, 
the released gas will cool down the surrounding area resulting in a cooler temperature than 
the normal temperature. As a result, the sensing cable will trigger an alarm indicating a 
leak (Nikles, 2009). The LDS system based on this technology performs multiple scans for 
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every measurement at a predefined time interval. Then the average is computed to 
determine the mean value of the measurement and this value will be the measured 
temperature.   The result will include a plot  showing distance versus temperature and any 
change along the path can be noticed very easily on the plot.   
 
This technology can provide accurate information in real time about the status of the 
monitored structure, which can significantly enhance the decision-making about what 
mitigation actions should be considered in the event a risk or safety issue becomes 
imminent.  
 
3.2.1  Scattering 
When optical laser light propagates through the fiber, it gets scattered in three different 
spectral forms.  They include Rayleigh, Raman, and Brillouin as indicated in Figure 3.1 
(Ulrich & Lehrmann, 2008). 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Scattering Mechanisms 
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The scattering is created due to impurities or changes of composition and interaction of the 
laser light with molecules of the fiber.  
 
The Raman-based technique can achieve sensing up to 37 km, with measurement time of 
< 3 min and temperature accuracy of 3 ºC, and measures temperature changes only (Bai & 
Chen, 2012; Park et al., 2008). The Brillouin scattering-based technique has the ability to 
sense temperature and strain changes along the fiber optic cable. The wavelength of the 
reflected wave is closely related to the changes of the surrounding temperature and strain 
of the fiber optic cable (Walk & Frings, 2010). This technique can achieve less than 1-m 
spatial resolution, 1-min measuring time, and 2 ºC temperature resolution, and up to 50 km 
sensing range (Bao & Chen, 2012). The range can be extended by using fiber optic 
amplifiers. The reported strain accuracy is approximately 10 micro strains (Bao et al., 
2001). As stated above, the Brillouin scattering-based technique outperforms the Raman-
based technique, as it can achieve longer sensing range, improved accuracy, less measuring 
time, and can measure both temperature and strain. Therefore, the focus of this research is 
on the Brillouin-based sensing. 
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3.2.1.1 Brillouin Scattering 
Brillouin scattering is caused by the fluctuations of the refractive index of the fiber. These 
fluctuations take place due to the variations of fiber composition, pressure, temperature, or 
density (Agrawal, 2001).  
 
The process is called inelastic because a transfer of energy between the incident light, 
photons, and the molecules of the fiber takes place. If the energy is transferred from the 
photons to the fiber material, then the backscattered light is downshifted in frequency. In 
this case, photons lose energy. Conversely, if energy is transferred from the fiber material 
(the silica glass) to the photons, then the backscattered light is upshifted in frequency. Here, 
photons gain energy and the frequency becomes higher. The shift in frequency is called the 
Brillouin frequency shift and is given by Agrawal (2001): 
 
𝑣𝐵 =  
2𝑛𝑉𝑎
𝜆
                                     (3.1) 
 
Where 𝑣𝐵  is the Brillouin frequency shift, Va is the acoustic velocity of the phonons, n is 
the refractive index of the fiber, and λ is the wavelength of the incident light.  
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3.2.2  Distributed Brillouin Sensing Techniques  
Several techniques are used for distributed Brillouin sensing. They include Brillouin 
Optical Time Domain Reflectometry (BOTDR), Brillouin Optical Time Domain Analysis 
(BOTDA), Brillouin Optical Frequency Domain Analysis (BOFDA), Brillouin Optical 
Correlation Domain Analysis (BOCDA), and Brillouin Echo Distributed Sensing (BEDS) 
(Soto et al., 2001). This thesis focuses on the BOTDA technique because it is one of the 
most commonly used monitoring techniques by the industry. 
 
 
3.2.2.1 Brillouin Optical Time Domain Analysis (BOTDA) 
BOTDA works by launching lasers in two opposite directions; one is pulsed and the other 
one is continuous. The frequency difference for the two lasers can be used to measure strain 
and temperature along the fiber (Bao & Chen, 2012).  
  
 
 
Figure 3-2: Illustration of a Simplified BOTDA System 
 
 
v1 is the pulsed laser or the pump signal; and v2 is the continuous wave (CW), also called 
the probe signal. In this configuration, the power of the probe signal is transferred to the 
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pump pulse, resulting in an increase in the intensity of the pulse as it travels along the fiber. 
This then yields a better signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and hence longer sensing range can be 
achieved (Bao et al., 1995; Belal, 2011). This configuration is referred to as Brillouin 
stimulated scattering (BSS). 
 
The Brillouin frequency shift is dependent on material temperature and strain. The 
Brillouin scattering may lose or gain energy; the energy loss is called a Stokes process and 
energy gain is called an anti-Stokes process. To enhance the interaction between the 
incident light (the pump signal) and the Stokes, a probe laser is launched at the opposite 
side of the fiber (Horiguchi & Tateda, 1989; Smith, 1999a). For the first laser a square 
pulse is used, as this is usually used for timing control because the square pulses are of 
equal duration. Every pulse sent will have the same time duration. The spatial resolution, 
which is the smallest length of the monitored object whose temperature change can be 
determined, can be calculated from the pulse width (see Equation 3.2).  
 
∆𝑧 =  
𝑐𝜏
2𝑛
                                  (3.2) 
             
Where c is the speed of light in vacuum, n is the fiber optic cable refractive index, and 𝜏 is 
the pulse width. There exists a linear relationship between the frequency shift and the 
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changes of temperature and strain (Smith, 1999b; Bao et al., 2001; Brown, 2006). The 
frequency shift can be expressed as follows: 
 
𝑣𝐵 −  𝑣𝑜 =  𝛼𝜀Δ𝜀 +  𝛼𝑇𝛥𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝           (3.3) 
 
Where 𝑣𝑜  is the reference Brillouin frequency at no strain and at ambient temperature 
MHz; 𝛼𝜀  is the strain coefficient expressed in MHz/με; 𝛼𝑇  is the temperature coefficient 
expressed in MHz/ºC; 𝛥𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 is the temperature change, which is the difference between 
the measured temperature and the ambient or reference temperature; and Δε is the strain 
change. The strain measurement is referred to as a micro strain (με). If a fiber optic cable 
has an original length of 1 meter and due to stress is stretched to 1.000007 meters, then the 
strain becomes seven micro strains (7 µm).  
 
Sensing is possible from the frequency shift, but the challenge is that the shift is dependent 
on both strain and temperature. From the frequency shift, it is impossible to determine 
which change has occurred. Temperature is the determining factor for the presence or non-
presence of a leak. To address this challenge, the fiber optic cable is held in close proximity 
to the pipe, as shown in Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3-3: Configuration for Temperature and Strain Detection 
 
The loose fiber is used to monitor the temperature change only, assuming zero strain since 
the fiber is held loose and not attached to the pipeline, Equation 3.3 can be re-written as:  
 
𝑣𝐵 −  𝑣𝑜 =  𝛼𝑇𝛥𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝                                  (3.4) 
 
Figure 3.4 uses Equation 3.4 to illustrate the linear relationship between the Brillouin 
frequency shift and the temperature for a system that has a reference frequency (𝑣𝑜) of 
14650 MHz measured at the ambient temperature with a rate of change of 1.4 MHz/ᵒC. 
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Figure 3-4: Brillouin Frequency Shift versus Temperature 
 
 
 
 
The Brillouin peak power can be expressed as (Smith, 1999b):  
 
𝑃𝐵 =  𝑃𝐶𝑊  𝑒
(−𝛼𝐿)  [1 − exp (−𝑔𝐵𝑃𝑃
𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑓
𝐴𝑒𝑓𝑓
)  ]                     (3.5) 
           
Where PCW is the input probe power, PP is the pulse power, gB is the gain, Leff and Aeff are 
the effective length and effective area of the fiber, respectively. The Brillouin peak power 
has a positive relation to the temperature. As the temperature increases, the Brillouin peak 
power increases. On the other hand, it is inversely related to strain. As strain increases, the 
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Brillouin peak power decreases (Parker et al., 1998; Smith, 1999b). The Brillouin peak 
power has a dependence on temperature and strain (Wait & Newson, 1996; Smith, 1999b).  
 
𝑃𝐵 =  𝑃𝑅 +
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑇
 𝛥𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 +
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝜀
Δ𝜀                                                  (3.6) 
           
Where 
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑇
 is the temperature coefficient (mW/ºC), and 
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝜀
 is the strain coefficient (mW/µε). 
Referring to Figure 3.3, the fiber is laid near the pipeline, assuming zero strain; the 
Brillouin peak power PB can be expressed as: 
 
𝑃𝐵 =  𝑃𝑅 +
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑇
 𝛥𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝                                                                                                    (3.7)  
 
Either Equation 3.7 or Equation 3.4 can be used to determine the temperature change. The 
location of the temperature change can be determined using Equation 3.8. 
 
𝑑 =  
𝐶Δ𝑡
2𝑛
                               (3.8)   
   
d is the location of the temperature change, c is the speed of light, n is the fiber optic 
cable refractive index, and Δt is time traveled.       
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3.3 PROBABILITY OF FALSE ALARM (PFA)  
 
PFA is the probability of declaring a leak when in fact no leak is present. Whenever noise 
power exceeds a predefined noise power, a false alarm is declared. Stated differently, the 
PFA is described as the likelihood that the LDS will falsely detect a leak when none exists. 
The PFA is expressed in terms of the threshold, which is the minimum detectable 
temperature change. Any measured signal level below the established threshold will be 
considered as a noise signal and does not contain any true power.   
 
Within the framework of signal detection theory, the mean and standard deviation of the 
noise are random. Noise is modeled as a normal distribution with zero mean (μ) and 
standard deviation (σ): N (0, σ). A false alarm occurs whenever the noise power exceeds 
the predefined noise power (Wickens, 2002). Figure 3.5 illustrates the noise power’s 
varying levels over time and the threshold; the threshold has been set to be at a value of 
two. This is the maximum acceptable noise power (σ2). Any departure of the noise power 
from the baseline (the threshold power) will signal an alarm indicating false detection. In 
fact, the signal is mainly a noise signal that is increased in amplitude and has exceeded the 
threshold value due to excessive noise generated by the equipment, frequencies interfering 
with the monitoring equipment, or other external factors. Using Monte Carlo simulation 
the results are shown in Figure 3.5.   
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Figure 3-5: Illustration of Noise Signal 
  
 
Every signal has two elements, power and noise, that respectively correspond to measured 
temperature and error, as indicted in Equations 3.9–3.14. The noise affects the final 
accuracy of estimated 𝛥𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝. 
 
3.3.1  Power Signal and Temperature Relationship 
The signal-to noise-ratio is defined as:    
𝑆𝑁𝑅 =
𝜇2
𝜎2
                                                                                                                         (3.9)  
 
The variance corresponds to the noise power or measurement error and the square of the 
mean corresponds to the power amplitude or measurement. Referring to Equation 3.7, the 
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power has a noise term that results in error in the measurement of temperature – Measured 
power signal = Power + Noise: 
 
𝑃𝐵 =   𝑃𝐵(𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑) + 𝑁𝑃         (3.10) 
 
Where PB(measured) is the measured Brillouin peak power and NP is the noise power. Both 
the PB(measured) and NP are measured at a given point in time. After obtaining the values of 
the measured power, the temperature change can be determined.  
 
Δ𝑇 = Δ𝑇𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 +     𝜀                                  (3.11) 
 
Where ε is a random measurement error that corresponds to noise in the signal with a mean 
of 0 and variance σ2. The Brillouin peak power PB in Equation 3.7 is the measured Brillouin 
power. Substituting Equation 3.7 into Equation 3.11, ΔT can be expressed as:  
 
𝛥𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 =  
𝑃𝐵(𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑)−𝑃𝑜
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑇⁄
  + 𝜀                                                    (3.12) 
 
Using Equation 3.10 and  Equation 3.11, the temperature change (𝛥𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝) is given as: 
  
𝛥𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 =  
𝑃𝐵(𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑)−𝑃𝑅
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑇⁄
+  
𝑁𝑃
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑇⁄
                                     (3.12.1) 
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Where 𝑃𝑅 is the reference power taken at the reference temperature change (this is not to 
be confused with the threshold temperature change) and 𝑑𝑃 𝑑𝑇⁄  is the temperature 
coefficient (mW/ºC). The first term in Equation 3.12.1 corresponds to measured 
temperature and the second term corresponds to measurement error (𝜀). Mainly, the 
measured temperature change is obtained from a set of n measurements, ΔT1, ΔT2… ΔTn 
expressed as: 
 
 
𝛥𝑇𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑  =  
𝛥𝑇1+ 𝛥𝑇2+⋯    𝛥𝑇𝑛  
𝑛
                                             (3.13) 
 
𝛥𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝  =   𝛥𝑇𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑    ±   
𝜎
√𝑛
            (3.14) 
 
Where 𝛥𝑇𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 is the measured temperature change, σ is the standard deviation of the 
measurement error, and n is the number of samples or the number of measurements. The 
system performs a number of scans, and each scan measures the temperature of the 
monitored pipeline and records the temperature at each point along the pipeline. At the end 
of the scanning, the averages of measured temperatures as well as the variance of 
measurement errors are taken.  
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3.3.2  Probability Density Function of the Noise Signal  
Figure 3.6 depicts the probability density for noise power. As shown in the figure, the 
shaded area on the right represents the failure region. This is the probability that the noise 
power (measurement error) exceeds the predetermined threshold. The threshold represents 
the minimum power level or the minimum detectable temperature change. 
 
 
Figure 3-6: Amplitude Distribution of the Noise Power Signal 
 
 
The PFA is expressed in terms of the threshold and the noise power level (σ2). The 
threshold will be either the lowest detectable power or the lowest detectable temperature 
change. The main task of the system is to detect if the received signal power level has 
exceeded the threshold. Therefore, to determine the PFA, the threshold and the number of 
data samples need to be determined. Assuming that the noise power level (σ2) is known 
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from previously recorded data for a large population, then the noise level for the sample of 
interest is σ2/n, the standard deviation is (σ/√n), where n is the number of data samples. 
There is a PFA for every threshold value. The mean of the noise signal is zero because the 
summation of the amplitudes of the noise power is zero. This is because the noise power 
signal levels vary and, as a result, the summation of the different signal levels becomes 
zero. When the measured signal level is greater than the threshold change, a false alarm 
will be declared. Let us define Xth, as the threshold power; then the probability of false 
alarm becomes:  
 
𝑃𝐹𝐴 =  
1
√2𝜋𝜎
2
𝑛
  ∫     𝑒
−𝑋2
2𝜎2
 𝑛⁄     𝑑𝑋
∞
𝑋𝑡ℎ
                                    (3.15) 
 
Integrating Equation 3.15 yields: 
     
 
𝑃𝐹𝐴 =  
1
2
[1 −   𝑒𝑟𝑓 (
𝑋𝑡ℎ
√2𝜎
2
𝑛
)]                                         (3.16) 
 
Where erf is the error function. The threshold power is calculated as: 
 
𝑋𝑡ℎ =  √
2𝜎2
𝑛
𝑒𝑟𝑓−1(1 − 2𝑃𝐹𝐴)                    (3.17) 
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Where 𝑒𝑟𝑓−1   is the inverse of the error function,  𝑋𝑡ℎ is the threshold,   σ2   is the noise 
power, n is the number of measurements, and PFA is the probability of false alarm.   Figure 
3.17 illustrates the PFA for various threshold power values for a system that has a 
bandwidth (𝛥𝑉𝐵) of 25 MHz and a temperature coefficient (αT) of 1.52 MHz/ºC. The figure 
reveals that as the threshold value increases the PFA decreases.  
 
 
Figure 3-7: PFA for Various Changing Levels of Power 
 
Figure 3.7 is re-plotted in Figure 3.8 to show the temperature change. This is for a system 
that has the same input data as indicated above and a temperature coefficient (dP/dT ) of 
0.9 mW/ºC. 
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Figure 3-8: PFA for Various Temperature Values 
 
 
3.3.3  Minimum Detectable Temperature by Fiber-Optic-Based LDS 
The minimum detectable Brillouin frequency shift (𝛿𝑉𝐵) as a function of SNR is expressed 
in Equation 3.18 (Horiguchi et al., 1992).   
 
𝛿𝑉𝐵 =
 Δ𝑉𝐵
√2(𝑆𝑁𝑅)0.25
                        (3.18) 
 
𝛥𝑉𝐵  is the Brillouin spectral width of the Brillouin input signal and SNR is the signal to 
noise ratio. Using Equation 3.18 and Equation 3.4 and assuming zero strain, the minimum 
detectable temperature change δT can be expressed as 3.19 (Horiguchi et al., 1992):  
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 𝛿𝑇 =  
Δ𝑉𝐵
 √2𝛼𝑇(𝑆𝑁𝑅)0.25
                                                          (3.19) 
 
Where αT is the temperature change coefficient expressed as MHz/ºC, and 𝛿𝑉𝐵 is the 
difference between the reference Brillouin frequency and the measured Brillouin frequency 
shift (𝑣𝐵 −  𝑣𝑜), as indicated in Equations 3.3 and 3.4.  
 
 
Figure 3-9: PFA for Various Temperatures Using  
                    Different Standard Deviation Values 
 
 
For a system with αT = 1.52 MHz/ºC, SNR = 21.18 dB, 𝛥𝑉𝐵 = 25 MHz, 𝛿𝑇 = 3.44 ºC, this 
is the minimum temperature change that can be detected by the system. From this, the 
minimum detectable peak power can be estimated using Equation 3.7. Assuming that the 
Brillouin reference power is 128 µW at a reference temperature of 5 ºC, with a power-
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temperature coefficient 0.9 µW/ºC, the power threshold can be estimated to be 131.1 µW 
and the threshold power change to be 3.1 µW. The variance of measurement has an effect 
on the PFA, as indicated in Figures 3.9 (shown on logarithmic scale) and 3.10 (shown on 
linear scale); as the variance of the measurement increases the PFA increases. Basically, 
these two Figures illustrate the PFA versus temperature change using two different 
standard deviations of the measurements. As the figures reveal that the increase in the 
standard deviation leads to higher PFA.   
 
 
Figure 3-10: PFA for Various Temperatures Using Different  
Standard Deviation Values 
 
Figure 3.11 illustartes PD versus PFA for different number of measurement samples, as 
the Figure indicates that a set that has 1000 samples of measurements at a PD value of 1 
has a PFA value of 0.2133. At the same PD value of 1, a set of 100 samples of 
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measurements has higher PFA value of 0.3031. This indicates that the increase or decrease 
in the number of samples affects the PFA and PD. This is illustrated in these two Figures 
that as the size of the sample increases the PFA decreases. 
 
 
Figure 3-11: PD versus PFA Using Different Sample Sizes 
 
3.4  PROBABILITY OF DETECTION AND MISSED DETECTION  
 
The PD is the likelihood that the LDS will correctly detect an actual leak. The probability 
of missed detection (PMD) is the probability that the system will not declare an actual leak. 
The signal here is a combination of true signal power and noise power that respectively 
correspond to measured temperature change and the measurement error of the temperature 
change. Figure 3.12 shows the probability density for power signal plus noise. Detection 
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occurs in the event the measured signal power exceeds or is equal to the predetermined 
threshold.   
 
Figure 3-12: Amplitude Distribution of the Power Signal           
 
Probability of missed detection (PMD) is expressed as:  
 
𝑃𝑀𝐷 =  1 −  𝑃𝐷                                 (3.20) 
 
Let us define the lowest detectable power change as Xth and power change as X; then the 
PD can be expressed as: 
 
𝑃𝐷 =  
1
√2𝜋𝜎
2
𝑛
  ∫     𝑒
−(𝑋 − 𝜇)2
2𝜎2
𝑛  ⁄     𝑑𝑋
∞
𝑋𝑡ℎ
                                            (3.21) 
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Xth is the threshold power level change and the µ is the mean value taken for every group 
of measurements, X is the amplitude that represents the measured power level of the 
incoming signal, and σ2 is the noise power. Integrating the above equation, Equation 3.22 
yields: 
 
 
𝑃𝐷 =  
1
2
[1 −   𝑒𝑟𝑓 (
𝑋𝑡ℎ− 𝜇
√2𝜎
2
𝑛
)]                          (3.22) 
 
 
Four possible cases result from modeling the detection and false detection: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PD : Leak exists and LDS 
indicates that a leak 
exists 
- (hit) 
PMD : Leak exists and LDS 
does not report the 
leak 
- (miss) 
PFA : Leak does not exist 
and LDS indicates it 
exists 
- (false alarm) 
POCR : Leak does not exist 
and LDS indicates it 
does not exist 
 
 
- (correct 
rejection) 
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Figures 3.13 and 3.14, respectively, show the PD versus the power level and temperature 
changes at a given threshold. As the figures illustrate, the PD is directly proportional to the 
power level and temperature changes: the greater the power or temperature changes the 
higher the PD. According to Equation 3.23, there are three parameters that need to be 
determined: the noise variance and the mean of the data samples, which are obtained from 
the characteristics of the received signal, and the threshold, which is determined as a 
function of PFA using Equation 3.16.  
 
 
 
Figure 3-13: PD versus Signal Power Level Change 
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Figure 3-14: PD versus Signal Temperature Change 
 
PD can be expressed in terms of PFA by substituting Equation 3.17 into Equation 3.22 to 
yield: 
 
𝑃𝐷 =  
1
2
[𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐 (𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐−1(2𝑃𝐹𝐴) −  
𝜇√𝑛
√2𝜎2
)  ]                       (3.23) 
     
Where erfc is the complementary error function and erfc-1 is the inverse of the 
complementary error function. Referring to Equation 3.9, which is shown below as 
Equation 3.25, the power is µ2 and noise power is  𝜎
2
𝑛⁄ . 
 
𝑆𝑁𝑅 =  
 𝜇2
𝜎2
𝑛⁄
                                      (3.24) 
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√𝑆𝑁𝑅 =  
√𝑛µ 
𝜎
                                        (3.25) 
  
Equation 3.23 can be expressed in terms of SNR as: 
 
𝑃𝐷 =  
1
2
[𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐 (𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐−1(2𝑃𝐹𝐴) − √
𝑆𝑁𝑅
2
 )  ]                        (3.26) 
 
The PD can be expressed in terms of the threshold by substituting Equation 3.19 into 
Equation 3.22: 
 
𝑃𝐷 =  
1
2
[1 − 𝑒𝑟𝑓 [ √
𝑛
2𝜎2
(
Δ𝑉𝐵
√2 𝑆𝑁𝑅0.25𝛼𝑇
−  𝜇)]  ]                               (3.27) 
 
Figure 3.15 illustrates that the PD increases with the increase of the temperature change. 
This means that there is higher probability of detection for higher temperature change. 
Another observation that can be noted is the increase of the SNR leads to a better PD and 
PFA tradeoff. Furthermore, the probability of detection is improved when the number of 
sample size (alternatively called scans) for one measurement gets larger. This is illustrated 
very clearly in Figure 3.17. 
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Figure 3-15: PD at Different Values of SNR   
 
 
Figure 3.16 shows the relationship between PD and PFA—for every PD value there is a 
corresponding PFA value. The figure also illustrates that as the PFA increases, PD 
simultaneously increases.  
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Figure 3-16: PD versus PFA 
 
 
Moreover, the larger the sample sizes or number of scans, the better the SNR and PD 
values. Figure 3.17 illustrates that as the sample size increases the PD increases when the 
detected T is higher than the threshold.  
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Figure 3-17: PD for Different Sample Sizes 
 
 
3.5  TOTAL PROBABILITY OF MISSED DETECTION AND FALSE ALARM 
 
The system is considered a series system because the failure of one LDS segment will lead 
to a complete failure of the system. Assuming the pipeline has n number of independent 
pump stations every 50 kilometers, where the station is equipped with an optical repeater 
to boost and regenerate the signal to achieve complete sensing coverage, then the total 
PMD (𝑃𝑀𝐷𝑇) for the entire LDS can be expressed as: 
 
𝑃𝑀𝐷𝑇 = 1 − ∏ (1 − 𝑃𝑀𝐷)
𝑛𝑛
𝑖=1 ,      𝑖 = 1, 2, … . , 𝑛           (3.28) 
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Similarly, the total probability of false alarm (𝑃𝐹𝐴𝑇) for the entire LDS can be expressed 
as: 
𝑃𝐹𝐴𝑇 = 1 − ∏ (1 − 𝑃𝐹𝐴)
𝑛,      𝑖 = 1, 2, … . , 𝑛 𝑛𝑖=1                                        (3.29) 
 
3.6  SUMMARY  
 
The PFA and the PD have been formulated and analyzed for a fiber optic-based LDS.  The 
missed detection and false detection are both critical to the system performance, and the 
consequences of their occurrence cost time and money.   The consequences of missed 
detection result in a greater financial burden than the consequences of false detection. 
Therefore, the first and foremost step in the design process is to determine the magnitude 
of the tolerable or acceptable risk in the event a missed detection takes place.  
  
64 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4  
PROBABILISTIC PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT OF FIBER 
OPTIC LEAK DETECTION SYSTEMS 
 
This part of the research develops a probabilistic performance assessment scheme based 
on limit state approach for the entire fiber optic LDS. The probabilistic assessment outcome 
includes the probability of failure for the entire LDS along the pipeline. The probability of 
failure encompasses detection failure and false detection. Detection failure is the 
combination of missed detection and delayed detection. Additionally, this chapter assesses 
the response time for the entire LDS along the pipeline. Probabilistic methods and Monte 
Carlo simulation have been used to accomplish the research that has been undertaken under 
this chapter. Matlab was used as a programming tool to run the assessment and simulation.  
 
Overlap may exist between this chapter and chapter 3, but they address two different topics. 
Chapter 3 tries to present a formulation of the PD and the PFA and this chapter tries to 
determine these two parameters using the limit state approach. Essentially, this chapter 
demonstrates how the limit state approach can be used to calculate the probability of failure 
(probability of missed detection) for fiber-optic-based LDS. This is a departure from 
traditional approaches, where the limit state approach is strictly used in structural 
reliability. In the electronic domain, the same concept can be used to determine the 
reliability or the probability of failure.  In the analysis, the operating voltage, or the 
achievable/operating sensitivity is considered to be the load, and the specified voltage or 
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sensitivity is considered to be the capacity.   The load gets affected by the noise, inherent 
uncertainty of the electronic device, and some other external factors that affect 
performance. In the same manner, as elaborated in chapter 5, for the pipelines the limit 
state approach is used to calculate the probability of failure (the load there is the operating 
pipeline pressure and the capacity is the specified or design pressure). Likewise, for the 
corrosion the load is the measured corresponding depth at time T and the capacity is the 
specified critical corrosion depth.  
  
4.1  LEAK DETECTION SYSTEMS  
LDS play a major role in enhancing reliability and operability of oil and gas pipelines. 
They have the functional capabilities to detect, locate, and quantify leaks before they can 
cause drastic effects to environment and operation. LDS performance is typically affected 
by three types of failures that have severe consequences: delayed detection, missed 
detection, and false detection of a leak. These failures pose a financial burden on operating 
companies. For example, missed detection leads to oil spills and exposes operating 
companies to financial risk and destroyed image, while false detection results in 
unnecessary deployment of personnel and equipment. To ensure operation continuity and 
a safe environment, LDS should be assessed regularly. To fulfill this need, this research 
has developed a probabilistic performance assessment scheme based on limit state 
approach for fiber optic LDS. The inherent uncertainties associated with leak detection and 
reporting capabilities are modeled to determine the LDS detection failure probability that 
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combines two failure events, missed detection and delayed detection. Moreover, the 
probability of false detection is derived in terms of the lowest detectable change, the 
threshold. These three parameters, the probability of detection, probability of delayed 
detection and probability of false alarm establish the basis for an overall assessment scheme 
that can be used at any time to provide an up-to-date assessment of the LDS. The results 
will serve as the basis for deciding whether to upgrade, repair, or replace system 
components or the system as a whole. The proposed assessment scheme has been applied 
to a case study to demonstrate its usefulness and feasibility. 
 
4.2  WHY LEAK DETECTION SYSTEMS NEED TO BE ASSESSED 
The main task of any monitoring process in the oil and gas industry is to ensure that safety 
and integrity of the plant are intact at all times. Continuous monitoring provides timely 
information about the status of the monitored components and detects the existence of 
anomalies before they can cause catastrophic failures; such anomalies include cracks or 
corrosion that may eventually lead to pipeline rupture or leak. Fiber optic distributed 
sensing is one of the most promising technologies that can provide ongoing monitoring, 
with the ability to perform continuous sensing along the entire length of the monitored 
structure. The fiber optic acts as a sensor, providing sensing and advance warning 
capabilities in real time and on a continuous basis. LDS based on this technique work by 
comparing the temperature variations against a previously recorded baseline temperature. 
Any deviations from the baseline will indicate an abnormality has occurred. In this study, 
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the temperature change as the main determining factor for the presence of a leak will be 
studied using probabilistic methods. 
  
Asset integrity guidelines mandate that the assets should perform their required functions 
in a safe, efficient, and effective manner (HSE, 2009). Therefore, there is a need to have a 
reliable and effective system to provide the assurances that the monitored pipeline is safe 
and functioning as per operating conditions. Hence, the behavior of the monitoring system 
should be assessed frequently and the assessment should take into consideration the 
probabilistic nature of the system.  
 
Traditional assessment methods are deterministic and do not consider the probabilistic or 
random nature of the environment and its impact on the system. Due to the randomness, 
uncertainties exist and present a great challenge to the assessment. To deal with this 
challenge and be able to provide a measurable value of the performance, a probability based 
assessment approach should be adopted.   
 
In light of the above, this research will apply a probabilistic assessment of key performance 
parameters for a fiber optic-based LDS. Factors that degrade the performance of a typical 
LDS include missed detection, delayed detection, and false detection. These failures will 
be grouped into detection failure, which is expressed in terms of missed detection and 
delayed detection, and false detection (or false alarm). The rationale behind these two 
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groups is that the failure consequences are different. Missed detection affects the ability of 
the LDS to detect a true leak while delayed detection influences the response time. And 
false detection affects system performance in terms of sensitivity.  
 
4.3 DISTRIBUTED SENSING AND FIBER-OPTIC-BASED LDS 
 
Distributed sensing technology can provide ongoing sensing capabilities along the 
monitored structure. As a result, systems based on this technology can provide early 
warnings of any abnormalities that may occur.  One of the systems based on this technology   
is the fiber-optic-based LDS.   
 
Fiber-optic-based LDS works by comparing the previously recorded baseline temperature 
with the measured temperature. If the transported product is oil, a higher than previously 
recorded temperature causes a signal to scatter back to the source, indicating the presence 
of a leak (Nikles, 2009). If the transported product is gas and the pipeline is leaking, the 
released gas will cool down the area surrounding the leaking spot, which will reduce the 
temperature than the previously recorded temperature, thereby causing the signal to scatter 
back to the source and indicate the presence of a leak.  
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4.3.1  FIBER OPTIC SENSING  
One of the distributed sensing techniques is the Brillouin Optical Time Domain Analysis 
(BOTDA) (Soto et al., 2011), which is the focus of this section. It is widely used by the 
industry for condition monitoring and reporting.  
 
BOTDA configuration, as shown in Figure 4.1, works by transmitting two different signals 
in opposite directions. The difference in the frequency of the two signals is used to measure 
strain and temperature changes along the sensing fiber optic cable. When the fiber is 
attached to an object, any changes in the object’s temperature or the occurrence of any 
strain will affect the sensing fiber.   
 
 
Figure 4-1: Simplified Illustration of BOTDA System 
 
A linear relationship exists between the frequency shift, the temperature and strain changes 
that may occur along the sensing fiber. This relationship can be expressed as indicted in 
Equation 4.1 (Smith et al., 1999b; Bao et al., 2001; Brown, 2006). 
 
𝑣𝐵 −  𝑣𝑜 =  𝛼𝜀Δ𝜀 +  𝛼𝑇𝛥𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝                                                                                               (4.1)  
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Where 𝑣𝐵 is the Brillouin frequency shift, 𝑣𝑜   is the reference Brillouin frequency at no 
strain and at the ambient temperature expressed in MHz, 𝛼𝑇  is the temperature coefficient 
expressed in MHz/ºC, 𝛼𝜀   is the strain coefficient expressed in MHz/με, 𝛥𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 is the 
temperature change, and Δε is the strain change.  
 
The frequency shift is dependent on both temperature and strain, and thus it is difficult to 
determine which change has occurred along the fiber optic cable. The temperature change 
should be determined in order to conclude if a leak has occurred or not. To solve this issue, 
the fiber optic cable should be strain free; in other words, the fiber should be laid near the 
pipe, as indicated in Figure 4.2. 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Configuration for Temperature Change Detection 
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The system sends a signal along the sensing fiber. If a leak takes place the returning signal 
will be shifted in frequency, which will indicate the presence of a leak and its location. 
From Figure 4.2, and Equation 4.1, the new relationship between frequency shift and 
temperature change becomes: 
 
𝑣𝐵 −  𝑣𝑜 =  𝛼𝑇𝛥𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝                                                                                                                (4.2) 
 
The minimum detectable temperature change (𝛥𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝) in Equation 4.2 depends on 
spectrum bandwidth, signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), as well as the temperature coefficient 
(Horiguchi et al., 1992). This relationship is expressed in Equation 4.3. Let us define the 
minimum detectable temperature change (Δ𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝) as  𝛿𝑇, then the minimum detectable 
temperature change becomes (Horiguchi et al., 1992): 
 
𝛿𝑇 =   
Δ𝑣𝐵
√2 𝛼𝑇(𝑆𝑁𝑅)0.25
                                                                                                             (4.3) 
 
Where δT is the minimum detectable temperature, ΔvB is the Brillouin spectral width, SNR 
is the signal-to-noise ratio, and αT is the temperature coefficient change (expressed in 
MHz/ºC). 
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4.4 MODELING FAILURE 
The main assumption of the performance assessment is that the parameters that influence 
the performance of the system vary and does not stay the same during operation. The 
capacity, or as it is sometimes called the resistance, is a design parameter that dictates the 
system’s ability to deliver. It represents the maximum capability of the system to sustain 
the maximum operational load imposed on it. The variability of the level of capacity is 
mainly attributed to the inherent uncertainties associated with the operating characteristics 
and sometimes due to external factors that impact system performance. Thus, the capacity 
is assumed to be probabilistic. Using the same argument, the load of the system is also 
assumed to be randomly fluctuating. 
 
These fluctuations result from varying operating conditions, operational demand, or 
environmental loads. Within this context, the performance function is defined as the 
difference between the capacity and the load. Since both are probabilistic, the performance 
is assumed to be probabilistic as well. Referring to Figure 4.3, the probability of failure can 
be computed as (Nowak & Collins, 2000):  
 
𝑃( 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒) = 𝑃(𝐶 < 𝐿)                                                                                         (4.4) 
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Where L is the load and C is the capacity or resistance of the system. Equation 4.4 expresses 
the fact that the probability of failure is a conditional probability and encompasses all 
possible combinations of L = x and C < L; x is a specified limit value that the load should 
not exceed (Nowak & Collins, 2000). Considering this fact, Equation 4.4 yields (Nowak & 
Collins, 2000): 
  
𝑃𝑓 =  Σ 𝑃(𝐶 < 𝐿|𝐿 = 𝑥)𝑃(𝐿 = 𝑥)                                                                             (4.5) 
 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the PDF of both the load and resistance. The probability of failure can 
be estimated by taking into consideration the PDFs of the load and resistance. Referring to 
Figure 4.3, the summation in Equation 4.5 can be evaluated as an integral to yield: 
 
𝑃𝑓 =   ∫ 𝐹𝐶(𝑥)
∞
0
𝑓𝐿(𝑥)𝑑𝑙                                                          (4.6) 
               
 
Figure 4-3: Probability Density Functions of Load and Resistance 
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Equation 4.6 defines the probability of failure; the parameter 𝐹𝐶(𝑥) is the Cumulative 
Distribution Function (CDF) of the capacity (C) evaluated at x; and 𝑓𝐿(𝑥) is the Probability 
Density Function (PDF) of load (L) evaluated at x. The load that needs to be evaluated for 
all possible values of L is random, which is represented by the PDF, 𝑓𝐿(𝑥). An alternative 
approach for evaluating the integral is to use limit state functions (LSF), as indicated in 
Equations 4.7–4.14 (Haldar & Mahadevan, 2000; Nowak & Collins, 2000) using limit state 
function  (LSF) and Monte Carlo simulation techniques. 
 
An LSF represents the shift from desirable or safe operation to undesirable or unsafe 
operation (failure).   In essence, it defines the difference between the capacity and the load 
of the system. If the difference between the capacity and load is positive, the system is in 
a safe operating state. If it is zero, the system is at the limit state; if negative, the system is 
at a failure state.  
 
Two methods are presented in this thesis: sample statistics and counting method. Equation 
4.7 expresses the LSF as the difference between the capacity (C) and the load (L), which is 
formulated as: 
 
Z = C – L                                                                                                                 (4.7) 
       
75 
 
 
 
Where Z is the performance function, C is the capacity of the system, and L is the load 
imposed on the system. The probability of failure (Pf ) is defined in Equation 4.8. It defines 
the event when the specified capacity goes below the load of the system; at such an event, 
the LSF is violated.  
 
 Pf   = P (Z < 0)                                                                                                               (4.8) 
 
Equation 4.8 can be rewritten as: 
 
Pf   = P (C < L)                                                                                                               (4.9) 
 
This is the probability of failure that represents the event when the capacity becomes less 
than the load. Using Equations 4.7 and 4.8, the probability of failure can be expressed as:    
 
𝑃𝑓 =   Φ ( 
 0 −  (  𝜇𝐶 −  𝜇𝐿  
 √𝜎𝐶
2 + 𝜎𝐿
2 
)                                                                                                (4.10) 
 
Where  𝜇𝐶 is the mean of the capacity of the system, and 𝜇𝐿 is the mean of the load imposed 
on the system, 𝜎𝐶
2  and 𝜎𝐿
2  are the variances of the capacity and the load respectively. 
Solving Equation 4.10 to yield:  
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𝑃𝑓 = 1 −   Φ ( 
 (  𝜇𝐶 −  𝜇𝐿  
 √𝜎𝐶
2 + 𝜎𝐿
2 
)                                                                                                 (4.11) 
 
The reliability index is taken as the difference between the means of the capacity and the 
load divided by their standard deviations and is designated as β:  
 
𝛽   =    
  𝜇𝑧  
𝜎𝑍
                                                                                                                               (4.12) 
 
 
The reliability index is computed for every failure mode, where the probability of failure 
is expressed as:  
 
𝑃𝑓    = 𝜙(−𝛽) =   1 −  𝜙(𝛽)                                                                                                (4.13) 
 
Alternatively, the probability of failure is calculated when the LSF is less than zero using 
Monte Carlo simulation. Let us define Nf to be the number of simulation trials when the 
LSF is less than zero and N is the total number of simulation trials. Then the probability of 
failure can be expressed as: 
 
𝑃𝑓 = Nf /N                                                                                                     (4.14) 
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4.5   DETECTION FAILURE AND LIMIT STATE FUNCTIONS 
Detection failure comprises two key components: missed detection and delayed detection. 
Missed detection occurs when a leak takes place and the system fails to detect it. The lowest 
detectable temperature change is the determining factor for leak detection. Application of 
the concept discussed above in section 4.3 to model the failure for an LDS will result in 
two limit state functions (LSFs), one for missed detection and the other for delayed 
detection.  
 
 
4.5.1  Missed Detection 
When the system senses that the amplitude of the signal coming back to the source is equal 
to or exceeds the threshold (that is, the lowest detectable change), an alarm is declared to 
indicate the presence of a leak. A missed detection occurs when the system fails to estimate 
this change correctly.  The LSF for the missed detection is defined in terms of parameters 
that are probabilistic that include, power, noise power, temperature coefficient and the 
operational temperature change threshold. The first three parameters belong to the 
specified threshold. All these parameters represent the sources of uncertainties in the 
missed detection LSF.  The LSF for detection is formulated as: 
 
 𝑍1 =  𝛼𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑  −   𝛼𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔                                                                                            (4.15) 
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Where αspecified is the minimum detectable change in temperature, and αoperating is the 
operational temperature change threshold at a given point in time. In other words, αoperating 
is the attainable threshold by the system. The specified minimum detectable change 
represents the capacity, i.e., the minimum temperature change that can be detected by the 
system. The specified minimum detectable change is a design parameter that the system 
should be able to detect.  
 
The operating minimum detectable temperature change represents the load. In this case, 
the system has been adjusted to provide detectability for the lowest temperature change, 
αoperating. This is the demand or the load imposed on the system, which varies due to inherent 
uncertainties associated with the system. Variability in the noise levels is a major factor 
that affects the quality of the signal.   
 
As indicated in Equation 4.3, the minimum detectable temperature (δT) is basically the 
specified minimum detectable temperature change. Substituting Equation 4.3 into Equation 
4.15 yields: 
 
𝑍1 =  
Δ𝑣𝐵
√2 𝛼𝑇(𝑆𝑁𝑅)0.25
 −        𝛼𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔                                                                            (4.16) 
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The SNR is the signal-to-noise ratio. Noise is the standard deviation from the mean power 
of the incoming signal (Ravet, 2011), while the temperature accuracy is specified as twice 
the standard deviation, as per the specifications for fiber optic distributed strain and 
temperature sensors (OZ Optics, 2013).   
 
4.5.2  Delayed Detection 
The response time consists of three elements: pulse transmission time, signal-processing 
time, and the response time of the fiber optic cable to the temperature change (Liu et al., 
2003). The pulse transmission time is the time it takes to make one measurement of the 
temperature. The total pulse transmission time is dependent on the number of 
measurements made; in other words, it is the measurement time. The response time can be 
expressed as:  
 
𝑅. 𝑇. =  𝑡𝑇𝑃𝑇 + 𝑡𝑆𝑃 + 𝑡𝐹𝑅𝑇                                                                                                       (4.17) 
 
R.T. is the response time, 𝑡𝑇𝑃𝑇is the total pulse transmission time, tSP is the signal 
processing time, and tFRT is the fiber optic cable response time. The measurement time (tM), 
which is the total pulse transmission time, is given by Mahar (2008): 
  
Measurement Time = (No. of Measurements) x (𝑡𝑃𝑇𝑖)                                                 (4.18) 
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𝑡𝑃𝑇𝑖 is the pulse transmission time for a single measurement; it is expressed as a function 
of the fiber optic refractive index, distance, and speed of light in vacuum, which can be 
expressed as: 
 
𝑡𝑃𝑇𝑖 =  
2𝑛Δ𝑧
𝑐
                                                                                                                              (4.19) 
 
Where n is the refractive index of the fiber core, Δz is the fiber optic cable length in 
kilometers, and c is the speed of light (km/s) in vacuum.   
 
For a 100-km fiber, fiber optic refractive index is 1.5, speed of light in vacuum is 3e8 m/s, 
and pulse transmission time (𝑡𝑃𝑇𝑖= 2nΔz/c) is 1 millisecond. For a system programmed to 
make 1,000 measurements at a time, the measurement time or the total pulse transmission 
time will be (1e-3 s x 1,000 measurements = 1 second).  
 
Signal processing time (tSP) can take a few milliseconds and is dependent on the system 
design and specifications, and how fast the algorithm processes the signal. The fiber optic 
response time to temperature change is in the nanoseconds range and can be ignored.   
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Considering the above example, assuming a signal processing time for every scan or 
measurement to be 10 milliseconds, then the response time (R.T. = pulse transmission time 
+ data processing time + fiber’s response time) will be 11 seconds.  
 
The delayed detection causes missed detection for a period of time during which the system 
fails to detect the change. This occurs when the reading is displayed to be below the 
specified threshold. The limit state function for the response time can be formulated as 
shown below: 
 
𝑍2 =  𝑡𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑  −   𝑡𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔                                                                                               (4.20) 
 
Where tspecified is the maximum specified response time (assumed to be a constant value), 
and toperating is the operating response time at a given time. Only one element of the response 
time is assumed to be random, the data processing time. The time it takes to process the 
data is affected by the type of algorithm used and by internal electronics. toperating is the 
demand imposed on the system; this demand varies due to inherent uncertainties associated 
with the electronic components of the system and the thermal noise that affects 
performance. All these factors influence the performance of the system and create a varied 
response time. Substituting Equation 4.17 into Equation 4.20 yields: 
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𝑍2 = (𝑡𝑇𝑃𝑇 + 𝑡𝑆𝑃 + 𝑡𝐹𝑅𝑇) −      𝑡𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔                                                                            (4.21) 
 
Therefore, missed detection and delayed detection are two elements that cause detection 
failure. 
 
4.6  PROBABILITY OF FAILURE 
The delayed detection and missed detection events cannot occur simultaneously. This is 
due to the fact that during the delayed detection event, the detection will be delayed for a 
while before the system detects the leak, while for the missed detection event, the detection 
is missed altogether. Thus, the two events are mutually exclusive. Let us denote the missed 
detection event as MD, the delayed detection event as DD, and false detection (false alarm) 
as FA. Then the probability of failure becomes: 
   
𝑃𝐷𝑓 = 𝑃(𝑀𝐷 ⋃ 𝐷𝐷)  = 𝑃(𝑀𝐷) + 𝑃(𝐷𝐷)                                                                       (4.22) 
 
Assuming the sensing range is 50 km, then at every interval of 50 km there will be an 
optical amplifier to boost and regenerate the signal. If the pipeline has n independent 
stations, then the total probability of detection failure is computed as a series system 
(Ebeling, 1997):  
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𝑃𝑓𝐿𝐷𝑆 = 1 − (1 −  𝑃𝐷𝑓1)(1 −  𝑃𝐷𝑓2) … (1 −  𝑃𝐷𝑓𝑛)                                                 (4.23) 
 
Where 𝑃𝑓𝐿𝐷𝑆 is the LDS total probability of detection failure and 𝑃𝐷𝑓1 … … 𝑃𝐷𝑓𝑛 are the 
LDS probability of detection failure for each segment of the pipeline. The false alarm is 
formulated in the same manner as: 
 
𝑃𝐹𝐴 = 1 − (1 −  𝑃𝐹𝐴1)(1 −  𝑃𝐹𝐴2𝑛) … (1 −  𝑃𝐹𝐴𝑛)                                              (4.24)           
 
The flow chart in Figure 4.4 shows that the probability of failure is calculated using two 
Monte Carlo simulation methods: the sample statistics method and the counting method.  
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Figure 4-4: Flow Chart for the Probability of Failure Simulation 
 
4.7  CASE STUDY 
A fiber optic LDS was installed along a 1,000-km pipeline that has regeneration units 
installed at every 50 km. It has been specified to have a probability of false alarm of 0.0007. 
The LDS Threshold parameters including power, noise power, temperature coefficient, and 
bandwidth (Smith, 1999a) are provided in Table 4.1. Moreover, the table provides the 
parameters for the DATA processing time; these parameters were assumed based on (OZ 
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Optics, 2013).  The probability distribution for each parameter as indicated in the Table 
were assumed.  All the given data represent typical specifications used by the industry for 
such systems.  Figure 4.5 depicts the layout of the pipeline system and the LDS. The fiber 
optic LDS has the cable laid on the top and bottom of the pipeline to increase the coverage 
and sensitivity of detection. 
 
 
Table 4-1: Capacity and Load Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Units Mean S.D Distribution 
1.0                   Capacity 
1.1                   Threshold Temperature 
Bandwidth: 
ΔVB, 
MHz 35   Deterministic 
Power: P  µW 1 0.013 
Normal 
Distribution 
Noise: N  mW 0 0.013 
Normal 
Distribution 
Temperature 
Coefficient: 
αT  
MHz/C˚ 1.1 0.014 
Normal 
Distribution 
1.2                  Data Processing Time 
Data 
Processing 
Time: tP 
ms 10 0.1 
Normal 
Distribution 
2.0                  Load 
Lowest 
Detectable 
Temperature 
C˚ 2.4 0.04 
Normal 
Distribution 
Signal/Data 
Processing 
Time 
ms 10.2 0 Deterministic 
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Figure 4-5: Schematic of the Pipeline and the LDS Under Study 
 
The following assumptions were considered in the case study: 
 The signal bandwidth is maintained at a fixed value of 35 MHz and is assumed to be 
deterministic. 
 
 The signal power of the incoming signal is kept at 1 µW; this power corresponds to the 
lowest detectable temperature and is assumed to follow normal distribution.  
 
 The variance of the power is the noise power, which is 0.0132 µW.  
 
 The noise signal is assumed to follow normal distribution with a mean of 0 and standard 
deviation of 0.013. The noise power fluctuates up and down, the summation of the 
amplitudes is zero, and therefore the mean is equal to zero. 
 
 From the given power and the noise power we can determine that the SNR = P/N for 
the lowest detectable temperature; in this example SNR = 38 dB. 
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 The temperature coefficient is assumed to follow normal distribution with a mean of 
1.1 MHz/ºC and variance of 0.014. There is a 1.1 MHz change for every 1 ºC. 
 Signal processing time is the time required to process the data contained in the signal 
by the system. It follows a normal distribution with a mean value of 10 ms for the entire 
length of each pipeline segment of 50 km.  
 
4.8  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The failure probabilities and reliability indices shown in Table 4.2 were calculated and 
simulated according to the flow chart shown in Figure 4.4. Table 4.2 shows the calculated 
probability of missed detection and delayed detection using sample statistics (using 
reliability index β) and counting method (Nf/N).  
Table 4-2: Simulation Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 PMD 
Simulation 
Cycles 
β Pf  =1 – Φ(β) Nf/N 
   
7.00E+03 3.217 0.013 0.023 
1.00E+05 3.240 0.012 0.011 
1.00E+07 3.239 0.012 0.009 
 PDD   
Simulation 
Cycles 
β Pf  =1 – Φ(β) Nf/N 
    
7.00E+03 3.017 0.025 0.034 
1.00E+05 3.005 0.026 0.030 
1.00E+07 3 0.027 0.027 
 PDf   
Simulation 
Cycles 
Pf Nf/N 
  
7.00E+03 0.038 0.056 
1.00E+05 0.038 0.041 
1.00E+07 0.038 0.036 
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The estimate of the probability of failure approaches true value as N approaches infinity. 
The results indicate that the estimated probabilities of missed detection, delayed detection, 
and detection failure by the counting method converge to 0.009, 0.027, and 0.036, 
respectively. 
 
Figures 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 illustrate the probability of failures associated with delayed 
detection, missed detection, and detection failure, respectively. The probabilities are shown 
for various lengths of the pipeline with varying number of simulation cycles. The figures 
indicate that as the length of the pipeline increases, the probability of failure increases. 
      
 
Figure 4-6: Probability of Delayed Detection 
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Figure 4-7: Probability of Missed Detection 
 
 
 
Figure 4-8: Probability of Detection Failure 
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Figure 4.9 depicts the probability of detection failure for the 1,000-km pipeline for three 
different simulation cycles: 7e3, 1e5, and 1e7.  
 
 
Figure 4-9: Probability of Detection Failure versus Distance 
 
The figure reveals that the counting method and sampling method are in very close 
agreement. Figure 4.10 shows that the probability of false detection increases with the 
increase in the length of the pipeline. Usually the probability of false detection is a given 
parameter as part of the specifications; the PFA is given as 0.0007 in the case study. 
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Figure 4-10: Probability of False Detection versus Distance 
 
The effect of the coefficient of variation (CoV) on the probability of missed detection and 
delayed detection is obvious, as shown in Figures 4.11 and 4.12, respectively. These figures 
show that the calculated probability of missed detection and delayed detection are in close 
agreement for both the counting and sample statistics methods. It is evident from these 
figures that as the CoV is varied the probability of missed detection or delayed detection 
both increase with the increase in the length of the pipeline.  
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Figure 4-11: Sensitivity of Probability of Missed  
                          Detection Due to Changes of CoV for the  
                       Temperature Coefficient 
  
 
Figure 4-12: Sensitivity of Probability of Delayed Detection  
Due to Changes of CoV for the  
Data Processing Time 
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4.9 SUMMARY  
 
A probabilistic methodology based on limit state approach for assessing the performance 
of fiber optic LDS has been developed. The detection failure and false detection establish 
the basis of an overall assessment scheme.  The limit state equations were formulated on 
the assumption that the capacity and load are probabilistic as they are affected by the 
varying operational demand and the environmental conditions. From the study, it was 
found that the sample statistics technique and the counting method for calculating the 
probability of failure almost produce the same results. 
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CHAPTER 5   
APPLICATION OF PROBABILISTIC METHODS FOR ASSESSING 
THE INTEGRITY OF OFFSHORE PIPELINES 
 
This chapter presents and applies a developed probabilistic methodology for assessing the 
integrity of a pipeline and determining its probability of failure. The probability of failure 
is compared against a target probability of failure to determine the remaining life of the 
assessed pipeline. A limit state approach in conjunction with Monte Carlo simulations and 
failure pressure models available in codes and standards have been used to accomplish this 
task. Matlab software was used as a programming tool to run the simulation and analysis.   
 
5.1 WHY CONDUCT PROBABILISTIC ASSESSMENT OF AGING 
PIPELINES  
 
When offshore pipelines approach the end of their design life, their condition could threaten 
oil flow continuity as well as become a potential safety or environmental hazard. Hence, 
there is a need to assess the remaining life of pipelines to ensure that they can cope with 
current and future operational demand and integrity challenges.  
 
This chapter presents a methodology for assessing the condition of aging pipelines and 
determining the remaining life that can support extended operation without compromising 
safety and reliability. Applying this methodology would facilitate a well-informed decision 
that enables decision makers to determine the best strategy for maintaining the integrity of 
aging pipelines.  
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5.2 INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT OF AGING PIPELINES 
 
One of the main objectives for carrying out an assessment on an aging pipeline is to ensure 
that it is safe to operate and does not pose any threat to the environment, operations, or 
safety. Other objectives might be to increase the pipeline life beyond its design life in order 
to accommodate unforeseen oil and gas reserves, support increased oil and gas production, 
or incorporate new assets that are tied into the existing pipeline system. Some 
circumstances may require operators to maintain the pipeline’s design life even though 
there may be unexpected premature aging caused by increased corrosion growth or any 
other anomalies.  
 
A strong case exists that mandates the assessment of the remaining life of an aging pipeline 
in order to determine its ability to cope with current and future integrity challenges. This 
is where probabilistic methods are useful in assessing pipeline fitness for service and 
predicting remaining life based on the current condition.  
 
The initial step in the assessment process is to determine the failure modes. The next step 
is to define the limit states. The failure modes represent degradation mechanisms, i.e., 
corrosion, cracks, or other flaws, while the limit state represents the failure events, i.e., the 
leak or rupture of the pipe.  
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The probability of failure is estimated by probabilistic modeling in terms of the failure 
modes where uncertainty is included in the estimation. The Monte Carlo simulation method 
is used to assess and analyze the probabilistic characteristics of the random variables and 
then determine the probability of failure, either by sample statistics or by counting methods 
(Haldar & Mahadevan, 2000). 
 
Uncertainty in the collected inspection data, pipeline geometry, pipeline material 
properties, and operating characteristics present a great challenge to the analysis. A 
probability-based assessment approach was adopted as it is best suited to deal with 
uncertainty, where a quantifiable value of the probability of failure can be estimated 
(Lindley, 1982).  
 
The assessment study should take into account, but not be limited to, pipeline original 
design parameters, operations history, previous inspection data, extent of metal loss, 
corrosion rates, fatigue damage, coating breakdown, and cathodic protection degradation 
(ISO/TS 12747, 2011). 
 
This chapter presents a methodology that adopts probabilistic methods for assessing the 
current and future ability of pipelines to support operational demand without jeopardizing 
safety and reliability. Based on the outcome of the assessment, the pipeline fitness for 
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service as well as the remaining life is determined. The methodology is tested by a case 
study to demonstrate its applicability. 
 
Section 5.3 provides an overview of pipeline remaining life assessment; section 5.4 briefly 
discusses the pressure failure models, as recommended by various internationally 
recognized codes and standards; section 5.5 discusses the methodology undertaken to 
assess the pipeline remaining life; section 5.6 presents a case study; and section 5.7 
provides the results and discussion. Finally, summary and concluding remarks are 
presented in section 5.8. 
 
5.3 OVERVIEW OF REMAINING LIFE ASSESSMENT 
 
Remaining life is estimated as the time it takes the pipeline system to exceed the target 
failure probability. For an oil and gas pipeline to continue operating safely and reliably, a 
repair or replacement strategy should be in place that becomes readily available for 
implementation before the occurrence of failure.  
 
Sometimes de-rating the operating pressure might be the most viable option to extend the 
life of an aging pipeline. A corrosion flaw is the main contributor that accelerates the 
deterioration of pipelines. It reduces the pipeline strength over time, leading to premature 
failure and subsequently potential environmental damage and production losses. Every 
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corrosion flaw point along the pipeline can potentially lead to either a failure, resulting 
from the flaw penetrating the pipeline wall, or a burst when the internal operating pressure 
exceeds the maximum allowable pressure. Corrosion is the second leading cause of 
pipeline failure in Europe, the first cause being third-party interference (EGIG, 2011). Fifty 
percent of “loss of containment” events in Europe have been attributed to corrosion and 
other degradation mechanisms (HSE, 2010). Between 1996 and 2013, there were about 
3,616 offshore loss of containment incidents, as indicated by the U.K. HSE (2014).  
 
According to U.S. Department of Transportation – Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (PHMSA) there were about 10,620 pipeline-related incidents from 1994 to 
2013. Nearly 18.2% of these incidents were attributed to corrosion, causing 23 fatalities, 
77 injuries, and property damage costing $750,433,953. Out of these corrosion incidents, 
there were about 170 property damage offshore-related incidents costing nearly 
$49,335,245 (PHMSA, 2014).  
 
Deteriorating pipelines may fail and the consequences of their failures may have an impact 
on health, safety, and the environment. Assessment techniques such as structural 
reliability–based analysis is applied to determine the extent to which the asset life could be 
increased beyond the design life for a high-pressure natural gas pipeline having both 
onshore and offshore sections (Francis, Gardiner, & McCallum,  2002). 
 
99 
 
 
 
The available codes and standards can be used for assessing pipeline integrity and 
determining remaining life. However, the codes and standards follow a deterministic 
approach for calculating the different parameters that are part of the assessment. 
Furthermore, the methods presented in these codes and standards calculate the pressure 
failure only. Moreover, these methods are for general cases and are not site specific, as 
every pipeline is unique in terms of its geographic location, operating conditions, and 
operational demand. Considering these limitations, this chapter introduces a generic 
probabilistic method to reduce the uncertainties involved in the remaining life assessment 
by comparing several codes and standards.  
 
5.4 CODES AND STANDARDS  
 
Some of the codes and standards that could be used for assessing the remaining life of the 
pipeline include DNV (DNV-RP-F101, 2010); American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 
(ASME B31G, 2012); British Standards (BS-7910, 2005); and American Petroleum 
Institute (API-579-1, 2007). The recommended failure pressure models incorporated in 
some of these standards are discussed in section 6.4. 
 
This assessment focuses on corrosion flaws. There are three different categories of flaws: 
single flaw, interaction flaw, and complex-shaped flaw. A single flaw is one that does not 
interact with nearby flaws and it has its own failure pressure. An interacting flaw interacts 
100 
 
 
 
with other flaws in the same area, either axially or circumferentially, and the complex-
shaped flaw is a collection of groups of interacting flaws (DNV-RP-F101, 2010). 
 
The scope of this study focuses on the assessment of a single corrosion flaw or defect 
subject to internal pressure. Measured flaws that exceed 80% of the pipe wall thickness are 
not considered. Figure 5.1 illustrates a single flaw with its dimension in reference to the 
pipe wall thickness.  
 
 
Figure 5-1: Illustration of Flaw and Its Dimensions 
  
 
5.5  METHODOLOGY FOR FAILURE MODELING BASED ON LIMIT 
STATE FUNCTIONS  
 
 
The initial steps in the analysis of the remaining life assessment include determining the 
failure modes of the pipeline and establishing the limit states. The limit state represents the 
failure events (the leak or rupture of the pipe) while the failure modes represent degradation 
mechanisms (corrosion, fatigue cracking, etc.). The probability of failure is estimated by 
probabilistic modeling in terms of the failure modes where uncertainty is included in the 
estimation. The methodology presented in this study focuses on localized single corrosion 
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flaws. Matlab codes have been generated to implement the methodology and perform the 
simulation. The methodology is broken down into seven steps, as presented in the 
following subsections.  
 
5.5.1 Collect Data Pertaining to the Pipeline  
The data should include, but not be limited to, inspection, operation, and design data. 
Failure and inspection reports, repair reports, and assessment studies conducted previously 
should be included as part of the data to be studied prior to conducting the assessment. 
 
5.5.2   Determine the Failure Modes and Failure Events  
Two failure events could take place at any flaw point in the pipeline. The first one takes 
place when the pipeline pressure is below the failure pressure but the flaw has penetrated 
the pipeline wall, causing a small leak. In the second event, the operating pressure exceeds 
the burst pressure at the flaw point (i.e., exceeds the remaining strength of the flaw) causing 
a burst, which results in a large leak. 
 
It is assumed that the two events cannot occur simultaneously at any given point in time. 
This is because a leak resulting from corrosion will occur only when the flaw penetrates 
the wall, while the other failure event occurs when the operating pressure exceeds the 
specified maximum allowable pressure at a through-wall flaw point that is not yet entirely 
penetrating the wall.  
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It is assumed that a pipeline leak that results from corrosion penetrating the pipeline wall 
occurs if the maximum depth of the flaw equals the wall thickness and the operating 
pressure is at a level below the failure pressure (i.e., burst pressure).  
 
Furthermore, it is assumed that a pipeline leak that results from burst pressure occurs when 
the pipeline suffers plastic collapse at the corrosion flaw point. This is the event when the 
operating pressure goes higher than the failure pressure (i.e., burst pressure) at the flaw 
location and its depth is below the critical depth. These two limit state functions are 
considered in the analysis.  
 
5.5.3     Formulate the Limit State Functions  
 An LSF represents the shift from safe operation to unsafe operation or failure. The 
evolution of an insignificant corrosion flaw on a pipeline over time to a through-wall 
corrosion flaw is a good example that describes the transition from safe to unsafe operation. 
Essentially, it expresses the difference between the capacity and the load of the system. If 
the difference between the capacity and load is positive, the pipeline is in a safe operating 
state. If it is zero, the pipeline is at the limit state; if negative, the pipeline is at a failure 
state. The extent of the axial and radial flaw, pipeline geometry, pipeline operating pressure, 
and pipeline material properties are the main random variables of the LSF. The LSF is used 
to predict the probability of failure and it is expressed as (Haldar & Mahadevan, 2000): 
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Z = R – L                                                                                                                        (5.1) 
  
Where R is the resistance (capacity) of the system and L is the load imposed on the system. 
Then the probability of failure is computed as: Probability of Failure = P (Z < 0).  
 
5.5.3.1  Limit State Functions (LSF) 
5.5.3.1.1 Leak Due to Corrosion 
Based on the discussion in section 5.4.2, there are two LSFs; the first one expresses the 
difference between the critical corrosion depth (dc) and the measured corrosion depth d(T) 
at a given time T (refer to Equation 5.7). The second one expresses the variation between 
the burst pressure (Pf) and the operating pressure (PO) (refer to Equation 5.10). The first 
LSF describes the failure caused by the flaw penetrating the entire pipe wall thickness, 
causing a small leak. It must be noted that the pipeline does not undergo plastic collapse at 
the flaw point causing a burst. The only flaw involved here is the penetration of pipe wall 
by the corrosion.  
 
As per DNV-RP-F101, flaw depths that are greater than 85% of the pipe wall thickness are 
excluded from evaluation. Therefore, a value of 85% or less of the wall thickness should 
be considered as the capacity (resistance) of the pipe, i.e., the critical corrosion depth (dc). 
In this study, corrosion depths greater than 80% of the wall thickness will be excluded. 
Pipelines with corrosion depths exceeding 80% of the wall thickness are at a greater risk if 
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they continue transporting hydrocarbons (Ahmmed, 1998; Kiefner & Vieth, 1990). Thus, 
the critical flaw depth can be set at 80% of the wall thickness (Caleyo, Gonzalez, & Hallen, 
2002), as indicted below.  
 
dc = 0.8t                                                                                         (5.2) 
  
Alternatively, it can be derived in terms of the failure pressure or flow stress and hoop 
stress (Muhammed & Speck, 2002). The corrosion growth is assumed to be constant over 
time. In this study, the measured corrosion depth d and length L at a given point in time T 
are formulated as (Ahmmed, 1998): 
 
d (T) =  do + drate (T – To)                                   (5.3) 
                         
L (T) = Lo + Lrate (T – To)                     (5.4) 
 
Where do is the initial measured flaw depth, Lo is the initial measured flaw length, To is the 
time when the previous inspection was conducted, and drate and Lrate are the corrosion depth 
and length rates, respectively. Assuming that the corrosion rates, drate and Lrate, are constant 
throughout the evaluation interval, the corrosion rates can be expressed as: 
   
 drate = Δd/ΔT                                   (5.5) 
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Lrate = ΔL/ΔT                        (5.6) 
   
Δd and ΔL are the difference in mm between the current and the previous flaw depth and 
length measurements, respectively, and ΔT is the time difference between the current and 
the previous measurement. This will lead us to the first LSF for the flaw depth: 
 
Z1 = dc – d (T)                                 (5.7) 
 
This LSF evaluates the difference between the critical corrosion depth and the measured 
corrosion depth at time T. The initial corrosion is defined as do1; the measured corrosion 
growth for the next interval is the multiplication of the estimated corrosion annual growth 
rate by the interval added to the estimated corrosion growth of the previous interval (refer 
to Equation 5.9). Therefore, for every time interval Ti there is an LSF that can be expressed 
as:  
 
Z1 (Ti) = dc – d (Ti),          i = 1, 2 …n                             (5.8) 
 
 
Further, the corrosion growth for each interval can be expressed as: 
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 𝑑(𝑇1) =  𝑑01 
 
 𝑑(𝑇2) =  𝑑01 + 𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝛥𝑇2)                                        
                             . 
                 .             (5.9) 
 
𝑑(𝑇𝑛) =  𝑑(𝑇𝑛−1) + 𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝛥𝑇𝑛)      
 
 
𝑑01 is the initial flaw depth for interval 1 or year 1, and 𝑑(𝑇1), 𝑑(𝑇2), …, 𝑑(𝑇𝑛) are the 
estimated cumulative corrosion depths at the end of each interval or year 1, 2,…, N,  
respectively. 
 
 𝛥𝑇2, 𝛥𝑇3, and 𝛥𝑇𝑛 are the differences between two time intervals where the corrosion flaw 
measurement has been made, which can be expressed in the same order as (T2 –T1),  
 
(T3 –T2), (Tn –Tn-1). 𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 is the corrosion annual growth rate (mm/year) or the growth rate 
per time interval (mm/time interval). 
 
5.5.3.1.2 Leak Due to Burst 
The second LSF (i.e., Z2) defines the pressure change, which is the difference between the 
burst pressure Pf (failure pressure) and the operating pressure PO: 
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Z2 = Pf    -   PO                  (5.10) 
  
Pf is the pressure that causes the pipe wall to undergo plastic collapse at the flaw point 
subsequent to a through-wall flaw. In essence, this failure occurs at a location that has a 
partial through-wall corrosion flaw, which is typically less than 80% of the wall thickness. 
 
The LSF here is defined as a function of parameters that are probabilistic. These parameters 
include yield strength (YS), ultimate tensile strength (UTS), pipe diameter (D), pipe wall 
thickness (t), flaw depth d (T – To), and flaw length L (T – To). (T – To) is the time difference 
between the current and previous inspection times. Pressure failure is computed using the 
formulas presented in codes and standards: ASME B31G modified method; ASME B31G 
effective area method DNV-RP-F101 Part B; and BS-7910.  
 
Modified Method – ASME B31G 
Using ASME B31G modified method, the second LSF (Z2) can be expressed as: 
 
 
Z2 =   
2𝑡
𝐷
(𝑆𝑀𝑌𝑆 + 69 𝑀𝑃𝑎) [
1− 0.85(
𝑑(𝑇)
𝑡
)
   1−0.85( 
𝑑(𝑇)
𝑡
)(
1
𝑀
)
]  -   PO            (5.11)  
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Where t is the specified wall thickness, D is the specified outside diameter of the pipe, d 
(T) is the measured depth of the metal loss at time T, SMYS is the specified minimum yield 
strength, and M is referred to as a correction factor, as indicated in Equations 5.13 and 5.14.  
 
Effective Area Method – ASME B31G 
When using ASME B31G effective area method the second LSF (Z2) becomes: 
 
 
Z2   =   
2𝑡
𝐷
(𝑆𝑀𝑌𝑆 + 69 𝑀𝑃𝑎) [
1− (
𝐴(𝑇)
𝐴𝑜⁄ )
1− (
𝐴(𝑇)
𝐴𝑜⁄ )
𝑀
⁄
]   -   PO                (5.12) 
 
 
A is the area of the metal loss (Ld), and AO is the local original area (Lt). 
 
𝑀 =  (1 +  0.6275
𝐿2
 𝐷𝑡
 –  0.003375
𝐿4
𝐷2𝑡2
)0.5                     
                                                                               
                                                      (5.13) 
𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝐿2
𝐷𝑡
≤  50       
 
M =   0.032
𝐿2
 𝐷𝑡
 + 3.3          for L2/Dt > 50                             (5.14) 
L is the length of the metal loss. 
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DNV-RP-F101 (Part B)/BS-7910  
Similarly, when using DNV-RP-F101 (Part B), the second LSF (Z2) can be expressed as: 
 
𝑍2 =  
(2𝑡)(𝑈𝑇𝑆)
(𝐷−𝑡)
[
 
(1−   𝑑(𝑇)/𝑡)
(1− 
𝑑(𝑇)
𝑡𝑀
)
] −  𝑃𝑂                     (5.15) 
 
M = (1 + 0.31 
𝐿2
𝐷𝑡
)
0.5
                                                                (5.16) 
 
UTS is the ultimate tensile strength. Likewise, for every interval, there is an LSF that can 
be expressed as: 
 
Z2 (Ti)    = Pf (Ti)      -   PO,       i = 1, 2….n                  (5.17) 
 
Essentially, the model presented by BS-7910 mirrors the DNV-RP-F101 Part B model. As 
an example, the LSF based on the DNV-RP-F101 Part B becomes: 
 
Z2 (Ti) =   
(2𝑡)(𝑈𝑇𝑆)
(𝐷−𝑡)
[
 
(1−   𝑑(𝑇𝑖)/𝑡)
(1− 
𝑑(𝑇𝑖)
𝑡𝑀
)
]  -   PO,       i = 1, 2….n                 (5.18) 
 
 𝑀𝑖 =  (1 + 0.31 
𝐿𝑖
2 
𝐷𝑡
)
0.5
,                       i = 1, 2….n               (5.19) 
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L is the corrosion length at interval i: 
 
 
𝐿(𝑇1) =  𝐿01 
 
𝐿(𝑇2) =  𝐿01 +  𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝐿𝑇2) 
.                   (5.20) 
.      
𝐿(𝑇𝑛) =  𝐿0(𝑛−1) +  𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝐿𝑇𝑛)  
 
 
L (T1) is the estimated initial length of the corrosion flaw at the end of the first interval 
(LT1); L(Tn) is the estimated cumulative corrosion length at the end of the last interval 
(LTn); and Lrate is the corrosion rate (mm/year) or (mm/time interval).  
 
Figure 5.2 shows the framework for calculating the limit state functions. The first LSF 
evaluates the difference between the critical corrosion flaw depth and the measured 
corrosion depth at a given point in time. The second LSF calculates the pressure change at 
a given point in time. The failure pressure model of three standards, DNV-RP-F101, 
BS7910, and the modified and effective area methods by ASME B31G are considered in 
the assessment. 
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Figure 5-2: Framework for Limit State Function Evaluation 
 
5.5.4  Perform Uncertainty Analysis   
The random variables that belong to each LSF are analyzed where a probability density 
function is determined for each variable based on the available pipeline configuration and 
industry standard data. Once the probability distribution function (PDF) is determined for 
each variable, the distribution parameters are calculated and then the probability of failure 
is determined for the limit state functions. Matlab software is used to run the Monte Carlo 
simulation to calculate the probability of failure and thus the remnant life.  
 
5.5.5  Determine the Probability of Failure 
The probability of failure is expressed as: 
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Probability of Failure  = P (Z < 0)               (5.21)                            
              
The reliability index, β, (Haldar & Mahadevan, 2000) is given by: 
 
β =  
𝜇𝑍
𝜎𝑍
= [
𝜇𝑅   − 𝜇𝐿   
√𝜎𝑅
2+  𝜎𝐿
2
]                                                                 (5.22) 
 
  
The reliability index is computed for every failure mode whose probability of failure can 
be expressed as:   
 
Probability of Failure    = 1 – Φ(β)                   (5.23) 
        
As an alternative method, when using the Monte Carlo simulation technique, the 
probability of failure is computed when the LSF becomes less than zero. 
 
 Probability of Failure    = Nf/N                 (5.24) 
 
Nf is the number of simulation cycles when LSF is violated (i.e., when it becomes less than 
zero) and N is the total number of simulation cycles. The corrosion probability of failure 
for a flaw i at a given time Ti can be expressed as: 
113 
 
 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖 = 𝑃 (𝑍1𝑖  (𝑇𝑖)     <  0), 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛,                       (5.25) 
 
This failure could occur at any time when (d(T) ≤ dc) and the operating pressure becomes 
less than the burst pressure (PO < Pf). The burst probability of failure at a flaw i at a given 
time Ti can be expressed as: 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑓𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖    =   P (Z2i (𝑇𝑖)      < 0),   𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛                     (5.26) 
 
This failure could occur at any time when the flaw depth becomes less than the critical wall 
thickness (d(T)  < dc) and the operating pressure becomes less than or equal to the burst 
pressure (PO ≤ Pf). The probability of failure for each single flaw at each interval combines 
the probability of failure for the corrosion, as addressed in the first LSF, and the probability 
of failure due to a burst, as addressed in the second LSF. Therefore, the total probability of 
failure (𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑇) at each time interval for each flaw i becomes: 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑇𝑖 =   𝑃𝑜𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖  ∪ 𝑃𝑜𝑓𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖  ,         𝑖 = 1,2, … … , 𝑛        (5.27) 
 
The overall probability of failure for the entire pipeline for all flaws at a given time 
becomes: 
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𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑇(𝑃𝐿) = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑇1) … … … . (1 − 𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑇(𝑛))                                                  (5.28) 
 
Where 1, 2… n represent the flaw number.  
 
5.5.6  Determine the Target Reliability/Target Probability of Failure   
The target reliability is determined based on the recommendation of standards and codes, 
engineering judgment, and acceptable risk criteria. Upon establishing the target reliability, 
the target probability of failure can be determined; this is the maximum allowable failure 
probability. For subsea pipelines, DNV-RP-F101 safety class: normal recommends 10-4 
towards target probability of failure. In this study, 10-4 will be used as the target annual 
probability of failure per flaw (km) of the pipeline segment corresponding to a reliability 
of 0.9999. If the calculated probability of failure during operation exceeds the target 
probability of failure, then the pipeline is not safe to operate. 
 
5.5.7 Determine the Remaining Life 
The remaining life is the time when the pipeline probability of failure surpasses the 
specified target failure probability. In this study, failure probability is estimated through 
LSF using time-dependent deterioration mechanisms, as well as the burst pressure. The 
simulation was performed to determine the time that the failure probability exceeds the 
target failure probability. 
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The approach here is to determine the remaining life for each defective area of the pipeline 
and to give an idea of the overall probability of failure for the pipeline. Figure 5.A.1 shown 
in Annex A depicts a flow chart that summarizes the steps outlined in the methodology 
section.  
 
5.6  CASE STUDY 
 
5.6.1 Description  
A pipeline having an initial corrosion depth and length of 4.6 mm and 200 mm, 
respectively, was considered for the case study. Other relevant information pertaining to 
the pipeline is presented in Table 5.1. Figure 5.3 illustrates the relevant details of the 
pipeline. The goal is to determine the remaining life of the pipeline before it experiences a 
failure.  
 
Figure 5-3:  Pipeline and Corrosion Flaw Details 
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Table 5-1: Pipeline Parameters Used in the Case Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The corrosion depth and length rates were assumed to be 0.2 mm/year and 20 mm/year, 
and assumed to follow normal distribution. The inspection was conducted at the end of 
2013; the inspection will be conducted every 5 years going forward. It is assumed that the 
estimated initial corrosion length and depth as well as the corrosion growth rates are 
obtained from in-line inspection. Matlab software was used to run Monte Carlo simulations 
2x105 times. 
 
 
 
 
Variable Unit Mea
n 
CoV Distribution 
Internal Pressure Po MPa 6.7 0.14 Normal 
Distribution 
Pipe Diameter D mm 600 0.03 Normal 
Distribution 
Pipe Wall 
Thickness 
t mm 14 0.05 Normal 
Distribution 
Pipe Yield 
Strength 
σy MPa 423 0.07 Log Normal 
Distribution 
Pipe Ultimate 
Tensile Strength 
σU MPa 550 0.065 Normal 
Distribution 
Initial Corrosion 
Depth 
do mm 4.6 0.24 Normal 
Distribution 
Initial Corrosion 
Length 
Lo mm 200 0.02 Normal 
Distribution 
Corrosion Depth 
Rate 
drate mm/yr 0.2 0.2 Normal 
Distribution 
Corrosion 
Length Rate 
Lrate mm/yr 20 0.2 Normal 
Distribution 
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5.7 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
5.7.1 Remaining Life Assessment Based on Corrosion Limit State Approach 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the histogram for the flaw depth at year 1 and the predicted flaw depth 
for years 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25. The figure indicates that the mean value for the flaw depths 
for years 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 are 4.5, 5.5, 6.5, 7.5, 8.5, and 9.5 mm, respectively.  
 
   
 
Figure 5-4: Histogram of the Simulated Flaw Depth 
 
Figure 5.5 shows the estimated probability of failure with 10% error intervals. It is evident 
that the pipeline life can be safely extended from 11 to 13 years, 12 years being the most 
feasible remnant life.   
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Figure 5-5: Probability of Failure Due to Corrosion 
 
 
5.7.2  Remnant Life Based on Burst Limit State Approach  
5.7.2.1 DNV-RP-F101 (Part B)/BS-7910 
Figure 5.6 illustrates the probability of failure due to burst pressure based on DNV-RP-
F10. The figure indicates the remaining life within an estimated error band of ± 10%, 
which is 12.5 years.  
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Figure 5-6: Probability of Failure Due to Burst Pressure (DNV/BS) 
 
5.7.2.2   Modified ASME B31G 
Figure 5.7 illustrates the probability of failure due to burst pressure based on the modified 
ASME B31G methodology.  
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Figure 5-7: Probability of Failure Due to Burst Pressure (ASME) 
The figure reveals that the pipeline can operate safely up to 16 years before it might suffer 
a burst failure.   
 
5.7.2.3 Effective Area Method – ASME B31G 
Figure 5.8 shows the probability of failure due to burst pressure based on the effective area 
method of ASME B31G.  
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Figure 5-8: Probability of Failure Due to Burst Pressure  
– ASME Effective Area Method 
  
The figure reveals that the pipeline can operate up to 9 years before it may suffer a burst 
failure. This indicates that the DNV model is more conservative than the ASME modified 
model.   
 
5.7.2.4  Combined Probability of Failure Based on All Methods 
Figure 5.9 illustrates the probability of failures for the two failure events. The figure shows 
the probability of failure using the three methods: DNV-RP-F101, and modified and 
effective area methods by ASME-B31G. 
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Figure 5-9: Probability of Failure for the Two Failure Events 
  
Figure 5.10 shows the probability of failures for the two failure events and the remaining 
life in a linear scale. 
 
Figure 5-10: Probability of Failure for the Two Failure Events – Linear Scale 
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The estimated remaining life is presented in Table 5.2. The table clearly shows that the 
ASME effective area method provides the most conservative estimate.  
 
Table 5-2: Summary of Results 
 
 
 
 
It is evident from the analysis, that using probabilistic method provided results that are 
more   accurate.  This method allows a researcher to explore and predict the behavior of 
the system more easily.   Using deterministic approach may not provide accurate results 
because it considers only one point estimate of the parameters under study.   
 
5.8  SUMMARY 
 
A probabilistic methodology based on limit state approach for determining the probability 
of failure and the remaining life of pipelines has been developed.  The methodology 
adopted the models presented in codes and standards. The results revealed that ASME 
B31G effective area method is the most conservative method. The differences in these 
models are attributed mainly to the different approaches for calculating the area of defect 
shapes, and whether tensile or yield strength is used.   
 
COMBINED PROBABILITY OF 
FAILURE 
 
REMAINING 
LIFE 
(YEARS) 
DNV-RP-F101 (Part B)/BS-7910 11.5 
Modified ASME B31G 12 
Effective Area Method – ASME B31G 9 
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ANNEX 5.A 
Figure 5.A.1 – Flow Chart Outlining the Steps for the Methodology 
 
Abbreviations 
I &M: Inspection & Maintenance, LSF: Limit State Function, MCS:  Monte Carlo simulation, P
b
: Burst 
Pressure, P
o
: Operating Pressure, 𝐏𝐨𝐟  :  Probability of Failure, PofTarget: Target Probability of Failure, 
R.V: Random Variable, Req.: Requirements, T: Time  
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CHAPTER 6  
RISK ASSESSMENT OF OFFSHORE CRUDE OIL PIPELINE 
BURST FAILURE   
 
Condition monitoring systems play a major role in ensuring the continuity of operation and 
maintaining the reliability and safety of oil and gas infrastructure. One specific system is 
the Leak Detection System (LDS). The failure of this system to detect hydrocarbon releases 
from an offshore pipeline can have devastating effects on the operation and environment. 
Moreover, the failure consequences may bring about excessive financial losses and could 
threaten the survivability of the operating company in the market. The financial losses 
result from the cost incurred for repairing the damage caused by the released hydrocarbon 
product into the sea/ocean. Further losses are incurred as a result of the lost and deferred 
production due to the shutdown of the facility for repair. It is crucial that operating 
companies continually conduct risk-based assessments of their pipeline network and leak 
detection systems to ensure their integrity and operability are intact and that they do not 
pose any threat to the continuity of oil flow. Two fundamental components establish the 
risk-based assessment: the probability and consequences of failure for both the pipeline 
and the LDS. The joint probability of failure, which encompasses the pipeline failure and 
the detection failure is used to determine the overall probability of failure. The 
consequences of failure include economic as well as environmental consequences 
expressed in terms of monetary value. This chapter provides a risk-based assessment 
methodology to assess the reliability of offshore pipelines and leak detection systems in 
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order to help determine the level of risk associated with their failure. The assessment 
outcome is compared  against a target or acceptable risk level that can help decision makers 
to decide the most feasible action for averting risk. This chapter provides a methodology 
to assess the consequences of the simultaneous failure of the offshore pipelines (rupture) 
and its leak detection.    
 
6.1  BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
Failure of a hydrocarbon processing facility is a major concern for operating companies, 
which requires careful and considerate attention by all levels of the management hierarchy. 
Two critical components of the processing facilities that require ongoing attention are the 
oil and gas pipeline and its LDS. They require more attention as their failure is so critical, 
threatening the environment, safety, and production. To obtain an all-inclusive and accurate 
assessment of these components, a risk-based assessment approach should be adopted.  
 
It is estimated that about 29% of pipeline failures are related to pipeline deterioration, 27% 
are related to operation error, and 27% are related to third-party interference. Other causes 
include mechanical failure and geo-hazards, with 11% and 6%, respectively (Andersen & 
Misund, 1983). In Europe, 50% of loss of containment events were caused by corrosion 
(HSE, 2010), which is the second leading cause of pipeline failure (EGIG, 2011).  
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As per the U.K. Health and Safety Executive (2014), in the past 10 years there were 1,694 
incidents involving offshore hydrocarbon releases. According to the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, in the past 10 years there were about 306 incidents related to offshore 
pipeline systems resulting in US$514,225,096 in property damage (PHMSA, 2014). 
Approximately 71 of these incidents were related to the damage caused by hazardous liquid 
releases, costing about US$157,296,006, and 15,194 barrels of hazardous liquid spilled in 
the sea.  
 
To prevent such incidents from occurring and to minimize their destructive impact on 
environment and safety, the integrity of the pipelines and the functionality of the systems 
should be assessed on a regular basis. If the outcome of the assessment reveals that either 
one or both systems is likely to pose a safety or operational threat, immediate corrective 
action should be taken to prevent the occurrence of undesirable consequences.  
 
This chapter presents an integrated risk-based assessment approach for oil and gas process 
components, specifically pipelines and LDS. This approach can be used to predict and 
quantify the future financial impact in the event a pipeline or condition monitoring system 
(i.e., LDS) fails. The assessment will provide the expected level of risk expressed in 
monetary value. Knowing the level of risk beforehand will enable operating companies to 
allocate the required financial resources, and to cover the unexpected future financial losses 
that may result from the failure of a process component.  
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To demonstrate the applicability and viability of the assessment approach, it will be applied 
to a case study. The chapter starts by providing an overview and background of risk-based 
assessment in section 6.2. Section 6.3 discusses the first step in the assessment process, 
which is to formulate the probability of failure for the pipeline and the LDS. Section 6.4 
discusses the next step in the assessment process, which is to determine the consequences 
of failure (including economic and environmental consequences). Section 6.5 discusses the 
next step, which is to determine the level of risk. Section 6.6 applies the risk-based 
approach to a case study followed by a discussion of the results. Finally, section 6.7 
provides summary and concluding remarks.    
 
6.2  OVERVIEW OF RISK-BASED ASSESSMENT 
Earlier efforts by researchers in the area of risk-based assessment are cited in the references 
(Dey, 2001; Khan et al., 2004; Khan et al., 2006; Singh & Markeset, 2010; Thodi et al., 
2009; and Thodi et al., 2013). Risk-based assessment incorporates the likelihood and 
consequences of failure and is used to determine the expected level of risk. The estimation 
of the probability of failure, which can be calculated by statistical methods or expert 
judgments, is a major step in the assessment process. As per (ISO/TS 12747, 2011), failure 
is defined as “an event in which a component or system does not perform according to its 
operational requirements.” For instance, a subsea pipeline may fail to operate safely due to 
rupture or leakage caused by excessive corrosion or cracking. Obviously, the leaked 
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product will damage the surrounding environment and the problem becomes worse if the 
LDS fails to detect this failure in time. 
 
It can be understood from the above definition that failure of a system or a component of a 
system causes malfunction or degraded performance. It renders the system or a component 
of the system either partially or totally incapable of satisfying operational requirements. 
Moreover, the consequences of failure may threaten lives and the environment, and may 
bring about financial losses and liabilities that could ultimately affect the survivability of 
the operating company in the market.   
 
It is therefore of great importance that operating companies know in advance the expected 
level of risk when a pipeline fails. Knowing the level of risk beforehand enables planners 
and financial officers to allocate the resources and funding required to effectively deal with 
such accidents and to be better prepared when accidents do happen.  Figure 6.1 illustrates 
the failure and risk components in relation to the oil and gas pipeline and LDS.  
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Figure 6-1: Failure and Consequences 
          
The figure indicates that in order to know the risk, the probability of failure (Pof) and 
consequences of failure (Cof) should be known beforehand. The LDS failure and the 
pipeline failure events are independent, and as such the probability of their occurrence at 
the same time is the product of both probabilities. The consequences of failure incorporate 
environmental as well as economic consequences.  
 
Some codes and standards provide models for assessing corroded pipelines, but these codes 
and standards are based on a deterministic approach and exclude condition monitoring 
systems such as LDS from the assessment. In order to provide a reliable and comprehensive 
assessment of the integrity of the pipeline and its LDS, one should consider a probabilistic 
approach by providing a joint probabilistic assessment. Adopting this approach will 
provide a realistic assessment that better describes the actual condition of the system being 
evaluated. Additionally, it will enable evaluators to determine correctly if the systems are 
operating in a safe and reliable manner.  
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6.3  PROBABILITY OF FAILURE 
The probability of failure can be modeled using LSF that defines the change from safe 
operation to unsafe operation. The failure state is determined when the LSF is violated; in 
other words, when the LSF becomes less than zero. Equation 6.1 expresses the LSF that 
defines the difference between the capacity and the load as: 
 
Z = C – L                                                                                                                 (6.1) 
 
Where Z is the performance function, C is the capacity of the system, and L is the load 
imposed on the system. The probability of failure, which is indicated in Equation 6.2, 
defines the event when the specified capacity goes below the load of the system; at such 
event, the LSF is violated (Haldar & Mahadevan, 2000). 
 
Pf   = P (Z < 0)                                                                                                                (6.2) 
 
6.3.1  Pipeline and LDS Failures 
Every corrosion defect along the pipeline can lead to one of two failure events: a gradual 
leak due to the penetration of corrosion into the entire pipeline wall thickness or a sudden 
leak due to rupture. Sudden leaks take place when the internal operating pressure exceeds 
the maximum allowable pressure at the defect point. Similarly, the LDS may have two 
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different failure events: the missed detection and delayed detection. This is illustrated 
clearly in Figure 6.2.  
 
 
Figure 6-2: Pipeline and LDS Failures 
 
6.3.1.1 Pipeline Failures  
The causes of pipeline failure are broadly divided into two categories: time-dependent and 
time-independent (or random failures). Time-dependent failure encompasses corrosion or 
cracking. On the other hand, time-independent failure includes third-party interference, 
geo-hazards, or operation errors. The focus of this section is on the time-dependent failure, 
which is the corrosion.  
 
Every corroded point along the pipeline may fail due to the weakness of that point to resist 
the operating pressure (i.e., load). Initially, corrosion partially penetrates the pipeline wall 
until it eventually penetrates the entire thickness of the pipeline wall, causing a gradual 
leak. During the partial penetration, the pipeline poses a threat to the environment since the 
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pipeline could rupture at any time, causing a sudden leak due to the weakness of the 
corroded spot. Figure 6.3 illustrates the dimensions of a typical defect. The maximum depth 
is taken as the depth of the defect, d.  
 
 
Figure 6-3: Illustration of Flaw and Its Dimensions 
 
Each pipeline’s failure event might be associated with another failure event related to the 
LDS. When the LDS fails to detect a leak or rupture, then the failure consequences will 
have greater risk impact on the environment and production.  
 
The probability of pipeline failure can be expressed using the LSF, as indicated in Equation 
6.3. 
 
𝑍(𝑇) =    𝑑𝐶 − 𝑑(𝑇)                                                                                                                   (6.3) 
         
134 
 
 
 
𝑍 is the LSF that defines the difference between the critical corrosion depth 𝑑𝐶 and the 
corrosion depth 𝑑(𝑇) measured at time T.  
 
The depth of the corrosion plays a major role in the occurrence of the pipeline failure. 
Therefore, the focus should be on the depth of the corrosion that could cause failure events. 
As illustrated in Figure 6.3, the depth that is considered for the assessment is the maximum 
depth; thus it is crucial that this depth should be derived in terms of the pipeline operating 
characteristics and pipeline material properties.  
 
The ASME effective area model, as indicated in Equation 6.4 (ASME-B31G, 2012), 
expresses the pressure failure or the burst pressure for the corroded pipeline in terms of 
yield strength and defect area. 
𝑃𝑓𝑖( 𝑇) =
2𝑡
𝐷
(𝜎𝑦 + 69 𝑀𝑃𝑎) [
1− (
𝐴𝑖(𝑇)
𝐴𝑜⁄ )
1− (𝐴
(𝑇)
𝐴𝑜⁄ )
𝑀
⁄
]   
𝑀 = (1 +  0.6275
𝐿2
 𝐷𝑡
 –  0.003375
𝐿4
𝐷2𝑡2
)
0.5
  𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝐿2
𝐷𝑡
≤  50 (6.4) 
 
𝑀 =    0.032
𝐿2
 𝐷𝑡
 +  3.3,   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐿2/𝐷𝑡 >  50 
 
𝐴𝑖(𝑇) = 𝑑𝑖(𝑇) ∗ 𝐿𝑖(𝑇) 
 
𝐴𝑜        = 𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑖(𝑇) 
 
 
 
𝑃𝑓𝑖(𝑇) : Pressure Failure for Defect i at Time T – MPa 
t : Pipe Wall Thickness, mm 
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The corrosion growth is assumed to be constant over time, and the depth and length of the 
defect over the years are calculated using Equations 6.5, 6.5.1, and 6.5.2 (Aljaroudi et al., 
2014a).   
 
𝑑𝑖(𝑇0)        =  𝑑𝑖0 
𝑑𝑖(𝑇1)        =  𝑑𝑖0 +  𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑥(𝛥𝑇1) 
𝛥𝑇1             =  𝑇1 −  𝑇0                                                  (6.5)      
𝑑𝑖(𝑇𝑛)     =  𝑑(𝑇𝑛−1) +  𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑥(𝛥𝑇𝑛)                                                                                    
𝛥𝑇𝑛          =  𝑇𝑛 −  𝑇𝑛− 1  
 
 
 
 𝜎𝑦 : Specified Minimum Yield Strength – It is a design-specified parameter  
𝐴𝑖(𝑇) : Measured Defect Area at Time T – mm     
𝐴𝑂(𝑇) : Original Area Before Defect Has Occurred – mm   
𝑑𝑖(𝑇) : Measured Defect Depth at Time T – mm 
𝐿𝑖(𝑇) : Measured Defect Length at Time T – mm 
𝑀𝑖(𝑇) : Folias Factor 
𝑑𝑖0  : Initial Defect Depth – mm 
𝑑𝑖(𝑇1) : Estimated Cumulative Depth of Corrosion Defect i at the End of Interval 
1, mm 
𝑑𝑖(𝑇𝑛) : Estimated Cumulative Depth of Corrosion Defect i at the End of Interval 
n, mm 
𝛥𝑇1 : Time Interval 1  
𝛥𝑇𝑛 : Last Time Interval  
𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 : Corrosion Annual Growth Rate (mm/year)   
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Figure 6-4: Illustration of How to Determine the Time Interval ∆T 
                          
 
Figure 6.4 illustrates how to compute the duration of each interval. 𝑇𝑜  is the time when  the 
intial coorosion dpeth is measured. 𝑇1 is the end of the first time inetrval; at this time,  
another measuremnt of the depth is made. The first time interval will be (𝑇1 -  𝑇𝑜) and will 
be deisgnated as ∆T1 refereeing to time interval 1. It is assumed that the corrosion length 
grows as a percentage of the depth, as indicated in Equation 6.5.1 (ABS, 2006): 
 
𝐿𝑖(𝑇1) =  𝐿𝑖0 (1 +
𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝛥𝑇1
𝑑𝑖0
)                                                                (6.5.1) 
 
 
𝐿𝑖(𝑇1) is the length of defect i at the end of year 1, 𝐿𝑜is the initial or current length, and 
𝑑𝑖𝑜 is the initial depth. Then the length over time can be calculated as indicated in Equation 
6.5.2. 
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𝐿𝑖(𝑇𝑛)     =  𝐿(𝑇𝑛−1) (1 +
𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝛥𝑇𝑛
𝑑(𝑇𝑛−1)
)                                                               (6.5.2) 
 
 
𝐿𝑖(𝑇𝑛)  is the length of defect i at the end of year n, 𝐿(𝑇𝑛−1)  and 𝑑(𝑇𝑛−1)  are respectively 
the length and depth of defect i at the end of year n-1.     
 
To determine the corrosion depth that could cause a rupture failure event, Equation 6.4 is 
used to yield: 
 
𝑑𝐶  =       [
1− 
𝑃𝐷
2𝑡(𝜎𝑦+69 )
1− 
𝑃𝐷
2𝑡(𝜎𝑦+69 )𝑀
]                                                                          (6.6) 
 
This is the same approach adopted by Muhammed and Speck (2002) for the ASME B31G 
modified method, but this chapter uses the ASME B31G effective area method (ASME-
B31G, 2012). Substituting Equation 6.6 into Equation 6.3 yields: 
 
𝑍𝑖(𝑇) =    [
1− 
𝑃𝐷
2𝑡(𝜎𝑦+69 )
1− 
𝑃𝐷
2𝑡(𝜎𝑦+69 )𝑀
]     −   𝑑𝑖(𝑇)                                                                   (6.7) 
 
Then the probability of failure will be: 
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𝑃( 𝑍𝑖(𝑇)) ≤  0,           𝑖 = 1, 2, … … 𝑛                                                         (6.8) 
 
This is the probability of the pipeline failure that may result from a burst or rupture at the 
defective spot i at time T.   
 
 6.3.1.2 Leak Detection System Failures 
The LDS major failure components include missed detection and false detection. However, 
another failure element is the delayed detection, which is assumed to be negligible. The 
focus of this chapter will be only on missed detection. Missed detection adversely affects 
the ability of LDS to detect a true leak, while false detection influences the LDS detection 
sensitivity. Missed detection is only known during or after the occurrence of the pipeline 
failure, leak, or rupture, and at that event no alarm is declared to indicate the presence of a 
leak. In contrast, false detection is known only when an alarm is declared indicating the 
presence of a leak when in fact there is no leak present.  
 
The missed detection event occurs when the threshold value, which is the lowest detectable 
leak rate for volume-balance LDS, pressure change for negative-pressure LDS, or 
temperature change for fiber-optic-based LDS becomes greater than the specified 
threshold. This takes place due to fluctuations in the performance of the internal electronics 
of the system, inherent uncertainties of the system, or thermal noise. 
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The LDS fails when a missed detection of a true leak takes place; to determine the 
probability of missed detection (PMD), the probability of false alarm (PFA), the threshold 
and the probability of detection (PD) should be determined first.  
 
6.3.1.2.1 Probability of False Alarm 
PFA is the probability that the system declares the presence of a leak when in fact there is 
none present. The PFA for a fiber-optic-based LDS can be expressed in terms of the 
threshold, which is the lowest detectable temperature change (Aljaroudi et al., 2014b): 
 
 
𝑃𝐹𝐴 =  
1
2
[1 −   𝑒𝑟𝑓 (
𝑋𝑡ℎ
√2𝜎2
)]                                                                                            (6.9) 
 
PFA is the probability of false alarm, Xth is the threshold power, and σ2 is the variance of 
the noise power. Similarly, the threshold can be derived in terms of the PFA as (Aljaroudi 
et al., 2014b): 
 
𝑋𝑡ℎ =  √2𝜎2𝑒𝑟𝑓−1(1 − 2𝑃𝐹𝐴)                                                                  (6.10) 
 
It is assumed that either the specified threshold or the PFA is a given parameter as part of 
the LDS specification. The above discussion is about a general case that applies to all LDS 
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types. Let us assume that a fiber-optic, BOTDA-based LDS is used. Thus, the minimum 
detectable temperature change can be formulated as indicated in Equation 6.11 (Horiguchi 
et al., 1992): 
 
𝛿𝑇 =   
Δ𝑣𝐵
√2 𝛼𝑇(𝑆𝑁𝑅)0.25
                                                                                                          (6.11) 
 
 
 
 
 
𝛿𝑇 is the specified minimum temperature change that can be detected by a fiber-optic LDS 
based on BOTDA technique. A linear relationship exists between the power of the output 
signal and the temperature change, as indicated in Equation 6.12 (Smith et al., 1999): 
 
𝑃𝐵 =  𝑃𝑂 +
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑇
 Δ𝑇 +
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝜀
Δ𝜀                                                                                                   (6.12) 
 
𝑃𝐵 is the measured power of the signal in µW, 𝑃𝑂 is the power measured at the reference 
or the ambient temperature in µW, 
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑇
 is the power temperature coefficient (µW/ºC), and 
δT : Minimum Detectable Temperature Change – ºC 
ΔvB : Brillouin Spectral Width – MHz 
SNR : Signal-to-Noise Ratio 
αT : Temperature Coefficient Change – MHz/ºC 
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𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝜀
 is the power strain coefficient (mW/µε). Assuming zero strain when the fiber is laid near 
the pipeline, Equation 6.12 reduces to: 
 
 𝑃𝐵 =  𝑃𝑂 +
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑇
 Δ𝑇                                                                                                                 (6.12.1) 
 
6.3.1.2.2 Probability of Detection (PD) 
This is the probability that the system declares an actual leak; probability of missed 
detection (PMD) is the probability that the system does not declare the presence of a leak 
when in fact the leak is present. The PD can be expressed as (Aljaroudi et al., 2014b): 
 
𝑃𝐷 =  
1
2
[1 −   𝑒𝑟𝑓 (
𝑋𝑡ℎ− 𝜇
√ 2𝜎2
)]                                                                             (6.13) 
 
Xth is the threshold power level change, µ is the mean value taken for every group of 
measurements, X is the amplitude that represents the measured power level of the incoming 
signal, and σ2 is the noise power. The PD can be expressed in terms of the PFA (Aljaroudi 
et al., 2014b) as: 
 
𝑃𝐷 =  
1
2
[𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐 (𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐−1(2𝑃𝐹𝐴) − √
𝑆𝑁𝑅
2
 )  ]                                                              (6.14) 
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The PMD can be calculated using the following equation: 
 
PMD = 1 −  
1
2
[𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐 (𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐−1(2𝑃𝐹𝐴) − √
𝑆𝑁𝑅
2
 )  ]                                                   (6.15) 
 
This is the probability of missed detection or the probability of LDS failure (𝑃𝑜𝑓𝐿𝐷𝑆). 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑓𝐿𝐷𝑆 =   𝑃𝑀𝐷𝐿𝐷𝑆                                                                  (6.16) 
 
 
6.3.2 THE JOINT PROBABILITY OF FAILURE FOR THE PIPELINE AND LDS   
At any moment in time, two undesirable events may take place. A leak or burst failure may 
occur, due to the weakness of the defective point to resist the internal pressure load imposed 
on it; and the LDS may be unable to detect the leakage at the defective point. The failure 
probability for both events occurring at the same time (time T) for defect i is:  
 
𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑖(𝑇) = [𝑃𝑜𝑓𝐿𝐷𝑆𝑖][𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑃𝐿𝑖],   𝑖 = 1, 2, … 𝑛                                                               (6.17) 
                      
𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑖(𝑇) is the LDS and pipeline joint probability of failure at time T at defective spot i; 
𝑃𝑜𝑓𝐿𝐷𝑆𝑖 is the probability of LDS failure and can be calculated using Equation 6.15; and 
𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑃𝐿𝑖 is the pipeline probability of failure (for pipeline segment i) and can be calculated 
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using Equation 6.8. Each segment of the pipeline has its own failure and risk depending on 
the surrounding environment, the characteristic of the pipeline, and its operating condition 
(Bai & Mustapha, 2010). One approach is to consider each pipeline segment falling 
between two joints, and the probability of failure will be the probability of failure per joint 
(Hallen, Caleyo, & González, 2003). Each defect has its own probability of failure and risk 
that contributes to the overall probability of failure and risk of the entire pipeline. In this 
case, the probability of failure for the entire pipeline can be computed as a series system. 
 
The total probability of failure (𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑇) for every segment i along the entire pipeline and the 
LDS at time interval T becomes: 
𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑇(𝑇) =  1 −  (1 −  𝑃𝑜𝑓1(𝑇)) … (1 −  𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑛(𝑇))                                                  (6.18) 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑇(𝑇) is the total probability of failure at time T, 𝑃𝑜𝑓1(𝑇) is the probability of failure 
for segment i, and 𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑛(𝑇) is the probability of failure for segment n at time T. 
 
6.4  CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE  
Risk combines the probability of failure and its consequences. The consequences consist 
of economic as well as environmental consequences expressed in terms of monetary value. 
Risk can be expressed as: 
 
Risk = Pof x Cof                                                                                 (6.19) 
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Where Pof is the probability of failure and Cof is the consequences of failure. If there is 
more than one failure event (let us say n events) and each event has its own probability of 
failure and consequences of failure, then risk is the summation of individual risks (Faber, 
2007). 
 
Risk = ∑ 𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑖 .𝐶𝑜𝑓𝑖
𝑁
𝑖                                                                                           (6.20) 
 
Figure 6.5 illustrates that economic consequences include lost production, deferred 
production, and repair costs, and the environmental portion consists of socioeconomic, oil 
spill cleanup, and environmental damage costs (Kontovas, Psaraftis, & Ventikos, 2010). 
The total cost that might be incurred as a result of failure consequences can be calculated 
as: 
 
𝐶𝑇 =  𝐶𝐸𝑐𝑜  +  𝐶𝐸𝑛𝑣                                                                                           (6.21) 
 
Where 𝐶𝑇 is the total cost associated with the consequences of failure, 𝐶𝐸𝑐𝑜 is the total cost 
associated with the economic consequences, and 𝐶𝐸𝑛𝑣 is the total cost associated with the 
environmental consequences.  
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Figure 6-5: Consequences of Failure 
 
6.4.1    ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 
Environmental consequences can be divided into three general categories: socioeconomic 
consequences, oil spill cleanup, and environmental damage repair (Kontovas et al., 2010). 
A model for calculating the total spill cleanup cost was developed that calculates the 
compensation provided by the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPCF) for 
damage resulting from spills (Kontovas et al., 2010).  The total spill cost is expressed as 
(Kontovas et al., 2010): 
  
𝐶𝐸𝑛𝑣 =  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙 = 51432𝑄𝑇
0.728                                                      (6.22) 
 
Where QT is the size of a spill in tonnes and CEnv is the total cost associated with the 
environmental consequences. This covers the financial losses associated with the 
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environmental consequences, including socioeconomic consequences, oil spill cleanup, 
and environmental damage repair.  
 
This model, developed based on oil spill data from tankers, estimates the compensation 
cost, which is the amount of money paid by IOPCF to the owners of the tankers to cover 
the costs associated with the environmental consequences. The model incorporates the 
costs associated with the three major environmental consequences mentioned above.  The 
socioeconomic loss comprises income losses and property damage; the income losses 
include the lost income of the fishery and tourism industries (Liu & Wirtz, 2006; Kontovas 
& Psaraftis, 2008), while the cost of property damage includes the cost of restoring the 
property to its original condition.  
 
Every tanker owner is obligated to pay insurance to cover liability, and in the event that the 
tanker causes oil to spill in the ocean or the sea, the owner is compensated by IOPCF. The 
compensation is then used to cover the damage claims by the fishery and tourism entities, 
and to repair the environmental damage. Although this model was developed based on data 
from oil spills caused by tankers to estimate compensation costs, it can be used for oil spills 
caused by pipelines as well. This is because oil spills in the ocean or sea have the same cost 
regardless of the source of the spill.  
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6.4.2 ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES  
The first step in the analysis of the economic consequences is to determine the mass leak 
rate. It is derived in terms of the area of the leak opening, and the pressure and density of 
the leaked products.   
 
6.4.2.1 Mass Leak Rate  
The leak rate can be expressed as (DNV-RP-G101, 2010): 
 
𝑄 =  𝐴1𝐶𝑑√2𝜌(𝑃𝑜 −  𝑃𝑠)                                                                  (6.23) 
 
Where 𝑄 is the leak rate – kg/s; 𝐴1 is the leak opening cross section area – m2; 𝐶𝑑 is the 
discharge coefficient – 0.61 is used for oil (DNV-RP-G101, 2010); 𝜌 is the liquid density 
– (kg/m3); 𝑃𝑜 is the operating pressure of the pipeline segment – (N/m
2); 𝑃𝑠 is the external 
pressure surrounding the leaking spot – (N/m2); and 1Kg/s = 0.52 barrels/60 seconds.  
 
6.4.2.2 Lost Production  
The lost production value can be calculated using the following equation: 
 
𝐶𝐿𝑃 =  (𝑄𝐿𝑃) x (𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑙) x (𝑇𝐿𝑃)                                                                 (6.24) 
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𝐶𝐿𝑃 is the cost of lost production, 𝑄𝐿𝑃 is the quantity of lost production in barrels/hour, 𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑙  
is the oil price ($/barrel), and 𝑇𝐿𝑃 is the time duration of the lost production in hours. 
 
6.4.2.3 Deferred Production  
As per DNV-RP-G101, the deferred production losses in dollar value can be calculated by 
multiplying the amount of production (barrels/hour) by the oil price per barrel ($/barrel), 
and the duration of the deferred production (hours) at a reduced production rate. This 
chapter assumes that no reduced production rate will be applied, based on the assumption 
that the pipeline and the associated equipment are installed in series and no backup or 
redundancy is used. Therefore, the deferred production losses can be calculated in dollar 
value using the following equation: 
𝐶𝐷𝑃 =  𝑄𝐷𝑃 𝑥 𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝐶 𝑥 𝑇𝐷𝑃                                                                  (6.25) 
 
𝐶𝐷𝑃 is the cost of deferred production, 𝑄𝐷𝑃 is the quantity of deferred production in 
barrels/hour, 𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑙  is the oil price ($/barrel), and 𝑇𝐷𝑃 is the time duration of the deferred 
production from the start of the shutdown until the completion of the repair.  
 
6.4.2.4 Repair 
The cost of repair involves the cost of repairing the affected pipeline and may also involve 
adjacent equipment, if it had been damaged. Comparing the cost of repair with that of the 
deferred production, repair costs become small (DNV-RP-G101, 2010). The cost of repair 
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will mainly consist of two elements: unplanned inspection (UI) and unplanned maintenance 
(UM) costs. 
 
𝐶𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 =  𝐶𝑈𝑀 +  𝐶𝑈𝐼                                                      (6.26) 
 
Economic consequences can be calculated as: 
 
𝐶𝐸𝑐𝑜 =  𝐶𝐿𝑃 +  𝐶𝐷𝑃 +  𝐶𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟                                             (6.27) 
 
6.4.3 TOTAL FAILURE COST 
The total failure cost encompasses all cost components—the environmental, economic, and 
repair costs. Obviously, the increase of corrosion growth over the years will lead to an 
increase of the expected leak rate and the failure cost. The failure cost at year T is estimated 
by finding the future value of the currently estimated total cost at predetermined annual 
interest and inflation rates. The future value (FV) for an amount with inflation rate I and 
interest rate i can be expressed as (Ayyub, 2014): 
 
 
𝐹𝑉(𝑇) = 𝑃𝑉 (
1+𝑖 
1+𝐼
)
𝑇
             (6.28)  
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The total failure cost (CT) at year T can be expressed as: 
 
𝐶𝑇(𝑇) =  [𝐶𝐸𝑐𝑜(𝑇) +  𝐶𝐸𝑛𝑣(𝑇)] (
1+𝑖 
1+𝐼
)
𝑇
                                                                       (6.29) 
 
 6.5  CALCULATION OF RISK  
Referring to Equation 6.19 and making use of Equation 6.29, risk (expressed in dollar value 
at year T for a pipeline segment i) can be calculated by multiplying the probability of failure 
and the consequences of failure, which mainly becomes the expected cost: 
   
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖(𝑇) =  𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑖(𝑇)𝑥 𝐶𝑇𝑖(𝑇)                                                                                               (6.30)  
 
If both the LDS and the pipeline fail, it takes quite some time to isolate the leaking pipeline 
segment and thus the failing pipeline will cause an oil spill. The total risk at year T for the 
entire pipeline can be expressed as:  
  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑇(𝑇) =  ∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖(𝑇)
𝑁
𝑖                                                                                (6.31) 
 
6.6  CASE STUDY 
The case study involved a 500-km subsea pipeline laid at a depth of 10 meters underwater; 
one of its segments at the upstream side is suffering from an isolated metal loss defect.  
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                                      Table 6-1: Pipeline and Defect Parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The densities of oil and ocean water are 850 kg/m3 and 1,050 kg/m3, respectively. Table 
6.1 provides the details of the defect geometry and the information pertaining to the 
pipeline operating characteristics and mechanical properties. The pipeline is equipped with 
a fiber-optic-based LDS that has a probability of false alarm of 0.023, power-temperature 
coefficient of 0.9 µW/ºC, and SNR of 11 dB. The cost of unplanned inspections for the 
pipeline is estimated at $15,000, and the cost of unplanned maintenance is $100,000.  
 
If both the LDS and the pipeline fail, the response time to isolate the leaking pipeline 
segment is estimated at 96 hours and 120 hours to repair the leaking pipeline segment. It is 
necessary to determine the expected failure cost in year 2 and every two years afterwards 
up to the year when the probability of failure reaches the target probability of failure, which 
has been set at 10-4 for two cases. In the first case, the pipeline is not protected by an LDS 
and in the second case the pipeline is protected by an LDS with the assumption that the 
Variable Unit Mean CoV Distribution 
Internal Pressure Po MPa 7.7 0.07 Normal Distribution 
Pipe Diameter D mm 400 0.003 Normal Distribution 
Pipe Wall Thickness t mm 10 0.005 Normal Distribution 
Pipe Yield Strength σy MPa 420 0.07 Normal Distribution 
Pipe Tensile Strength σU MPa 520 0.065 Normal Distribution 
Initial Defect Depth do mm 3 0.24 Normal Distribution 
Initial Defect Length Lo mm 800 0.2 Normal Distribution 
Corrosion Depth Rate drate mm/yr 0.2 0.02 Normal Distribution 
Corrosion Length Rate Lrate mm/yr 20 0.2 Normal Distribution 
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corroded pipeline segment is left without being repaired. The cost is estimated at an annual 
interest rate of 3% and inflation rate of 7%. The corrosion flaw details, the pipeline and the 
LDS relevant details are illustrated in Figure 6.6.  
 
 
Figure 6-6:  Pipeline and Corrosion Flaw Details 
  
 
6.6.1  Results and Discussion 
Table 6.2 shows the estimated PD, PMD, PFA, and temperature change threshold for the 
LDS.         
Table 6-2: LDS Parameters 
 
 
 
 
LDS Parameters Value 
PD 0.94 
PMD 0.06 
PFA 0.023 
Threshold 2.6°C 
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Figure 6.7 illustrates the pipeline probability of failure with ±10% error interval. It is 
replotted in Figure 6.8 at the center point of the 10% error interval. The Figure   indicates 
that it will exceed the target probability of failure after the sixth year.  
 
Figure 6-7: Pipeline Probability of Failure  
             with 10% Error Interval  
 
 
 Figure 6-8: Pipeline Probability of Failure 
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The probability of failure for the LDS and the pipeline for the corroded segment is shown 
in Figures 6.9.  It is obvious from the figure that the probability of failure for both the LDS 
and the pipeline is lower than that of the pipeline alone. Moreover, the joint probability of 
failure for both the LDS and the pipeline exceeds the target probability of failure after the 
ninth year. DNV-RP-F-101 recommends a value of 10-4 as the maximum allowable annual 
probability of failure for offshore pipelines. The probability of failure for the pipeline alone 
corresponds to a pipeline without LDS, basically a pipeline without protection. As the 
figure indicates, the pipeline with LDS takes longer to reach the target probability of 
failure. Undoubtedly, the LDS will minimize environmental and safety impacts of a 
pipeline failure. This shows that there is a very slim chance that both the LDS and the 
pipeline will fail at the same time for which a leak is miss detected. Knowing the 
probability of failure for both the LDS and the pipeline will help in determining the 
expected level of risk in the event a failure occurs. 
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Figure 6-9: Comparison of the Probability of Failures for the Pipeline without LDS and 
the Pipeline with LDS 
  
The distribution of the expected defect depth and length are shown in Figures 6.10 and 
6.11, respectively.           
 
  Figure 6-10: Distribution of the Expected Defect Depth Growth 
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Figure 6-11: Distribution of the Expected Defect Length Growth 
 
Figure 6.12 illustrates the expected leak flow rate in the event the pipeline fails. The leak 
rate is in kg/s and the time interval is in years.        
 
Figure 6-12: Expected Leak Flow Rate over Time 
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Figure 6.13 illustrates the expected level of risk in dollar value and Figure 6.14 shows the 
results in bar format. The expected failure cost at year 10 exceeds US$62,000.  
 
Figure 6-13: Estimated Total Financial Losses Due to Failure Consequences 
  
This number is based on the assumption that the corroded segment of the pipeline is left 
without being repaired and that no inspection or preventive maintenance is conducted for 
the entire pipeline and the LDS. A summary of the expected failure cost is illustrated in 
Table 6.3.     
                                       Table 6-3: Expected Failure Cost 
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With LDS 
Without 
LDS 
Year Pof 
Expected 
Cost 
(US$) 
Pof 
Expected Cost 
(US$) 
2 2.99077E-08 3.08 4.93E-07 50.85 
4 4.09072E-07 55.38 6.75E-06 913.70 
6 4.44894E-06 775.95 7.34E-05 12,801.19 
8 3.66254E-05 8,094.79 0.000604229 133,544.02 
10 0.000225274 62,257.70 0.003716468 1,027,098.39 
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Figure 6-14: Estimated Total Financial Losses Due to Failure Consequences 
 
It is evident from the study that probabilistic methods provided accurate results because 
they allow the incorporation of the parameters’ inherent uncertainties in the analysis.         
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6.7  SUMMARY 
 
An integrated probabilistic methodology for assessing the integrity of a corroded pipeline 
and its leak detection system has been presented. The limit state function approach was 
used to calculate the pipeline probability of failure. The limit state function was formulated 
to define the difference between critical corrosion depth and the estimated corrosion depth 
at time T for the pipeline.  
The LDS probability of failure was derived in terms of probability of false alarm.  Every 
defect spot along the pipeline fails due to the weakness of the spot to resist the load imposed 
on it, i.e., operating pressure. Regardless of the failure event, a leakage or a rupture, the 
failure occurs as a result of the inability of the defect spot to resist the operating pressure. 
The pressure model recommended by ASME B31G [14] effective area method was used 
in this study and the model was rearranged to calculate the defect depth that could cause 
one of the two failure events (the leakage or rupture).   
The consequences of failure consist of economic and environmental damages that have 
been estimated in monetary value. The economic consequences comprise the repair cost, 
and lost and deferred production costs. The environmental consequences include 
socioeconomic consequences, oil spill clean-up, and environmental damage repair. It is of 
great interest to oil and gas operators to know in advance the expected level of risk in the 
event the system fails so that they can be better prepared to deal with such failure incidents.   
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CHAPTER 7                                                                                                       
RISK ASSESSMENT OF OFFSHORE CRUDE OIL PIPELINE 
FAILURES: LEAKAGE AND BURST 
 
Failure of Leak Detection System (LDS) to detect pipeline leakages or ruptures may result 
in drastic consequences that could lead to excessive financial losses. To minimize the 
occurrence of such failure, the functionality of the LDS and the integrity of the pipeline 
should be assessed on a priority basis. This chapter presents an integrated risk-based 
assessment scheme to predict the failure and the failure consequences of offshore crude oil 
pipelines. To estimate risk, two important quantities have to be determined, the joint 
probability of failure of the pipeline and its LDS and the consequences of failure. 
Consequences incorporate the financial losses associated with environmental damage, oil 
spill cleanup and lost production. The assessment provides an estimate of the risk in 
monetary value and determines whether the estimated risk exceeds a predefined target risk. 
Moreover, the critical year for the asset can be determined.  In essence, the   outcome of 
the assessment facilitates an informed decision-making about the future of the asset.      
 
7.1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Pipeline rupture or leakage that has been miss-detected by LDS exposes public, or the 
environment to safety and health hazards.  Moreover, it decreases oil and gas production 
and in the worst cases scenario causes a partial or complete shutdown of the production 
facility.  According to the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE UK, 2011) there were 
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about 1,978 incidents involving offshore hydrocarbon releases between 2001 and 2011 in 
the UK continental shelf. As per the US Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (PHMSA, 2014), there were about 306 offshore pipeline incidents in the 
U.S in the past 10 years. Out of these incidents, 71 involved hydrocarbon releases. Any 
failure involving the release of hydrocarbons may end up in a catastrophic incidents 
resulting in fatalities, damage to the environment and may threaten the corporate economy.  
The worst impact of all is the exposure of the public to danger in areas where the pipelines 
are close to shorelines or residential areas.  
 
In light of the above, assessing the pipeline and its LDS to ensure that they do not present 
any safety or operational risks is highly recommended. Such assessment should take into 
consideration the pipelines degradation mechanisms and their growth rate.  Moreover, the 
assessment should be comprehensive and should consider the likelihood and consequences 
of failure of the pipeline and the LDS.  To address these issues, a risk-based assessment 
method is recommended to determine the level of risk expressed in dollar value. Having 
such information will enable operators to determine when and where to take the appropriate 
action to mitigate risk.  
 
Several authors have contributed to the subject of risk-based assessment for maintenance 
planning, optimum replacement of the degraded components or risk assessment and its 
impact on safety and the environment.  Risk-based assessment methods have been used to 
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determine the optimal replacement of offshore process components, based on the 
likelihood and consequence of failure caused by time-dependent degradation mechanisms 
(Thodi, et al., 2013).   Bayesian theory along with risk-based assessments have been 
applied to update the probabilistic pipelines deterioration (Khan, et al., 2006; Straub & 
Faber, 2005; Tang, 1973) and to determine the optimal inspection plans (Straub & Faber, 
2005).     Moreover, risk based methodology has been used in conjunction with other 
techniques such as fuzzy logic to address subjectivity and uncertainty. Risk-based 
assessment methodology based on fuzzy logic has been used to perform risk-based 
assessment for pipelines, (Singh & Markeset, 2009). Likewise, risk-based methodology 
has been used in conjunction with Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) to select a 
maintenance strategy, (Bevilacqua & Braglia 2000; Zhaoyang, et al., 2011). Multi 
attributes decision making techniques have been used to improve risk assessment 
methodology to analyze risk and to provide a maintenance model for oil and gas process 
components, (Khan et al., 2004).     
 
The cost associated with the offshore or subsea facilities is much higher than that of the 
onshore facility (Rangel-Ramı-rez, & Sorensena, 2012). For the offshore cases, the 
unplanned inspection, repair or replacement work requires mobilization of equipment and 
personnel transported by boats or by a helicopter, and in some cases may require the 
deployment of Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs). In addition, the extensive 
coordination effort and logistics are very difficult to undertake. 
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As per the reviewed literature, the subsea pipeline was not specifically addressed in the 
risk based integrity assessment as a distinct component; all what had been indicated is a 
general case scenario for either a whole plant or other assets associated with the processing 
facility.  The risk-based assessment should take into account the degradation mechanisms, 
their growth rate and should determine the likelihood and consequences of failure. 
 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a risk-based methodology for assessing offshore 
crude oil pipeline leakage and burst failures.    The calculated risk is the expected financial 
losses that an operating company may incur as a result of the joint failure of the pipeline 
and the LDS. Essentially, the assessment helps decision makers to determine when and 
which component of the asset that requires an immediate remedial action.  
 
Section 7.2  provides an overview and background information; section 7.3 summaries 
pipeline risk assessment; section 4 outlines the methodology to assess the pipeline risk; 
section 5.0 presents a case study; section 6.0 presents the results and provides a discussion 
about the results and finally section 7.0  provides a summary and concluding remarks.  
 
7.2 OVERVIEW  
 
The key elements of risk assessment are the estimation of the probability of failure and 
assessment of its consequences.  Pipeline degradation takes place as a result of corrosion, 
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cracks or any other anomalies that grow over time. If the anomalies are overlooked or 
ignored and left without being repaired or the affected assets are not replaced, they may 
grow randomly over time.  Hence, the pipeline probability of failure, which can be 
calculated by limit state approach, can be estimated by stochastic modeling of the 
degradation mechanisms.  For the corrosion, the limit state function defines the difference 
between the measured and the critical corrosion flaw depth, and for the collapse pressure, 
it defines the difference between the operating and failure pressures. The LDS probability 
of failure is the probability of missed detection that can be expressed in terms of the signal 
to noise ratio and the probability of false alarm (Aljaroudi et al., 2014b). The consequence 
of failure is estimated as the cost of failure, which comprises the cost of pipeline 
replacement, environmental damage repair, and financial losses associated with lost 
production.   
 
  7.3 PIPELINE RISK ASSESSMENT   
 
The assessments starts by determining the damage mechanisms and the rate of their growth 
over time and the likely failure events (leakage or burst).  The   limit state approach is used 
to estimate   the probability of failure where the probabilistic methods is used in the 
estimation. The variables that influence the limit state function are random and possess an 
inherent uncertainties that can only be modeled by probabilistic methods. The probability 
distribution of each variable is determined from the collected data or from historical 
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records. Once the distribution is determined, the distribution parameters can be easily 
calculated. The consequences of failure are estimated in terms of environmental damage 
repair costs and financial losses due to lost and deferred production. Critical year for the 
asset is the year that the asset’s probability of failure or the expected future risk exceeds a 
pre-established limit.  
  
7.4 METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING PIPELINE RISK   
 
7.4.1 Collect the Information Pertaining to the Pipeline 
Information should include but not limited to, pipeline mechanical properties, pipeline 
operating characteristics and the extent of the corrosion flaws.   
 
7.4.2 Determine the Failure Events  
 Each corrosion flaw point along the pipeline is subject to two failure events, either a 
leakage or burst. The leakage failure event occurs when the corrosion penetrates the entire 
thickness of the pipeline wall. While the burst failure event occurs when the operating 
pressure exceeds the failure pressure at a partially penetrated flaw spot along the pipeline. 
The failure consequences will be more sever if the LDS fails to detect the occurrence of 
leakage or burst causing oil spill and extensive production loss. Therefore, the focus of this 
chapter will be on the simultaneous failure of both the pipeline (leakage and burst) and the 
LDS.   
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7.4.3 Evaluate Corrosion Growth  
The expected corrosion growth over time can be calculated using Equation 7.1 (ABS, 
2006): 
 
𝑑 =  𝑑𝑜 +  𝑉𝑐𝑟 𝑇                                               (7.1) 
𝐿 =  𝐿𝑂 (1 +
𝑉𝑐𝑟 𝑇
𝑑𝑜
)                                                            (7.2)     
   
where  𝑑𝑜  is the initial corrosion depth, 𝑉𝑐𝑟  is the corrosion depth growth rate, T is the 
time interval and 𝐿𝑂  is the initial corrosion length, d  and L are  the estimated corrosion 
depth  and length respectively at time T.   
 
7.4.4  Define the Limit State Functions (LSF) 
Limit state approach can be used to determine the probability of failure for the pipeline.  
Based on the discussion at the beginning of section 7.4.2, two limit state functions can be 
defined. The first one expresses the difference between the critical corrosion and the 
measured corrosion at time T. the second limit state function expresses the difference 
between the critical pressure which is the burst or failure pressure and the operating 
pressure.   
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Equation 7.3 expresses the difference between the capacity (C) and the load (L) of the 
system being evaluated (Haldar and Mahadevan, 2000; Nowak and Collins, 2000).  
 
 Z = C – L                                               (7.3) 
 
Every flaw point along the pipeline has two possible failure events that can occur any point 
in time. The first failure event occurs as a result of the penetration of the corrosion flaw 
through the entire wall thickness of the pipeline leading to a small leak. The second failure 
event occurs when the operating pressure exceeds the maximum allowed pressure or the 
burst pressure at the corrosion flaw point causing a burst and then large leak (Aljaroudi et 
al., 2014a).  
 
a.   Perform Uncertainty Analysis   
Operating pressure, ultimate stress, yield stress, pipeline diameter, pipeline wall thickness, 
radial and axial extent of the corrosion flaw establish the basic random variables of the 
limit state function. These variables have inherent uncertainties that make the computation 
 
 of the limit state function a difficult task to undertake. To deal with this problem, a 
probabilistic assessment is used to better describe uncertainty in the limit state function 
variables.   The first step in the probabilistic assessment is to determine the probability 
distribution for each variable from the available pipeline data. Then the distribution 
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parameters can be calculated from which the probability of failure can be estimated using 
Monte Carlo simulation.  
 
b. Formulate Leakage LSF   
The capacity of the system for the first failure event will be the maximum allowed 
corrosion depth, dc that should not exceed 85% of the wall thickness (DNV-RP-F101, 
2010).  The load will be the measured corrosion depth d(T)  at time T (Aljaroudi et al., 
2014a).  Equation 7.3 can be rewritten as indicated in Equation 7.4. 
 
𝑍1 =  𝑑𝑐 −   𝑑(𝑇)                                                     (7.4)                                                               
 
c. Formulate Burst LSF 
The failure pressure can be calculated as recommended by the DNV part B allowable 
stress approach model for single defect (DNV-RP-F101, 2010) and (BS-7910, 2005): 
 
 𝑃𝑓 =  
2𝑡𝜎𝑈
(𝐷−𝑡)
[
 
(1−   𝑑(𝑇)/𝑡)
(1− 
𝑑(𝑇)
𝑡𝑀
)
]                                                                      (7.5) 
        
𝑀 =  (1 + 0.31 
𝐿2
𝐷𝑡
)
0.5
                                                                                                  (7.6)   
     
substituting Equation 7.5 into Equation 7.3 yields: 
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𝑍2 =  
2𝑡𝜎𝑈
(𝐷−𝑡)
[
 
(1−   𝑑(𝑇)/𝑡)
(1− 
𝑑(𝑇)
𝑡𝑀
)
]        −     𝑃𝑂                                                                               (7.7) 
 
𝑃𝑓 is the failure pressure, D is the specified outer diameter of the pipe in mm, t is the wall 
thickness in mm, d (T) is the measured corrosion depth of the metal loss in mm at time T, 
𝜎𝑈 is the ultimate tensile strength in MPa and 𝑃𝑂 is the operating pressure in MPa.  
                   
   
7.4.5 Determine the Pipeline Probability of Failure  
 
The probability of failure can be expressed as: 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑓 = 𝑃 (𝑍 <  0)                                                                                                           (7.8) 
 
 Two methods can be used to determine the probability of failure when using the limit state 
approach in conjunction with Monte Carlo simulation. These are the counting method and 
the sample statistics method. Under the first method, the sum of the number of simulation 
trials that volatile the LSF (𝑁𝑓) is computed, i.e. when the LSF becomes less than zero and 
this sum is divided by the number of simulation trials (N) to obtain the probability of 
failure.  
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𝑃𝑜𝑓 =  
𝑁𝑓
𝑁
                                                                              (7.9) 
 
Under the second method, the reliability index (β) is computed as indicated in Equation 
7.10:   
 
 𝛽 = 
𝜇𝑍
𝜎𝑍
                                                       (7.10) 
 
 𝜇𝑍 is the mean of the LSF and 𝜎𝑍   is the  standard deviation of the LSF.  𝜇𝑍 is taken as 
the summation of the LSF divided by the number of simulation trials.  
 
𝑃𝑜𝑓   =   1 −  𝜙(𝛽)                                            (7.11) 
 
The probability of failure due to corrosion can be expressed as (Aljaroudi et al., 2014a): 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑘 = 𝑃 (𝑍1𝑖  (𝑇𝑖)     <  0),  d(T)≤dc   and PO < Pf ,𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛                             (7.12) 
                   
𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑘  is the probability of leakage failure for a corrosion flaw i at time Ti. The capacity 
of the system for the second failure event will be the failure or burst pressure and the load 
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will be the operating pressure. The probability of burst failure can be expressed as shown 
in Equation 7.13, (Aljaroudi et al., 2014a).  
 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑓𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑡 = 𝑃 (𝑍2𝑖  (𝑇𝑖)     <  0),   d(T)  <  dc   and PO ≤ Pf ,    𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛                                (7.13) 
 
7.4.6 Determine the LDS Probability of Failure   
Probability of LDS failure will be the probability of missed detection. It is assumed that 
the LDS is a fiber optic based system using a Brillouin Optical Time Domain Analysis 
(BOTDA) technique for sensing.  The probability of false alarm and missed detection can 
be expressed as shown in Equations 7.14 and 7.15 respectively (Aljaroudi et al., 2014b). 
 
 
𝑃𝐹𝐴 =  
1
2
[1 −   𝑒𝑟𝑓 (
𝑋𝑡ℎ
√ 2𝜎2
)]                                                           (7.14) 
 
As stated above that the probability of LDS failure is the probability of the LDS missed 
detection, hence,   𝑃𝑜𝑓𝐿𝐷𝑆 = 𝑃𝑀𝐷.   
 
𝑃𝑀𝐷 =  1 −  
1
2
[𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐 (𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐−1(2𝑃𝐹𝐴) − √
𝑆𝑁𝑅
2
 )  ]         (7.15) 
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7.4.7  Determine Joint Probability of failure   
The joint probability of failure for the pipeline (𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑃𝐿 ) and the LDS (𝑃𝑜𝑓𝐿𝐷𝑆 ) can be 
expressed as: 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑓 =   𝑃𝑜𝑓𝐿𝐷𝑆 𝑥 𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑃𝐿                                                            (7.16)  
 
7.4.8        Determine the Failure Consequences   
a. Quantity of Leaked Products 
Quantity of leaked products can be calculated using Equation 7.17 (DNV-RP-G101, 2010): 
 
𝑄ℎ =  (3600) 𝑥 
𝜋𝐷2
4
𝐶𝑎√2𝜌(𝑃𝑜 − 𝑃𝑠)                                                     (7.17)                    
            
D is the estimated diameter of the leak opening that was  caused by the corrosion or burst 
pressure,  𝐶𝑎 is the discharge coefficient  – 0.61 (DNV - RP - G101,2010), 𝑃𝑜  is the 
operating pressure of the pipeline segment - (MPa), 𝜌   is the liquid density – (Kg/m3),  𝑃𝑠 
is the external pressure surrounding the leaking spot - (MPa),  𝑄ℎ  is the leak rate – Kg/h.    
b. Consequences  
Primarily, the consequences of failure (Cof) are the financial losses attributable to lost 
production cost (LPC), inspection cost (IC), segment replacement cost (RC) and 
environmental consequences cost (EC).     
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𝐶𝑜𝑓 = 𝐿𝑃𝐶 + 𝐼𝐶 +  𝑅𝐶 +  𝐸𝐶                 (7.18)  
 
As per (DNV- managing risk, 2015), the estimated pipeline replacement cost in the U.S is 
about $643800 per/km.  The inspection cost involves the cost of sending Autonomous 
Underwater Vehicle (AUV) with a ship to perform scanning of the pipe to determine and 
confirm the location of the pipeline leaking spot. The estimated cost for using AUV is 
approximately $26,000/day, (Wernli, 2000). This cost is based on year 2000, 1% percent 
is added per year as a cost trend (annual projected increase in the cost) to estimate the 
present cost. The cost of lost production consists of the cost of the lost quantity of oil spilled 
in the ocean and the cost of the delayed production due to the shutdown of the pipeline for 
repair; it can be expressed as indicated in Equation 7.19.  
 
𝐿𝑃𝐶 =  𝑄ℎ 𝑥 𝐶 𝑥 (𝑇𝑙𝑝 + 𝑇𝑑𝑝)                            (7.19)      
   
Where    𝑄ℎ  is the leak rate (Barrels per hour), C is the price of oil – ($/Barrel),   𝑇𝑙𝑝 is 
the period of time where the production was lost due to spill (hours), 𝑇𝑑𝑝  is period of time 
where the production was lost due to the shutdown of the pipeline for repair.   
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The costs associated with environmental consequences include the compensation paid to 
the fishery and tourism companies, environmental damage repair cost and oil spill cleanup 
cost. The fishery and tourism companies are compensated for that lost income during the 
presence and cleanup of oil spill (Kontovas et al., 2008; Liu and Wirtz, 2006). The cost 
associated with environmental consequences can be expressed as indicated in Equation 
7.20 (Kontovas et al., 2010). 
 
𝐸𝐶 =   51432[0.001 (𝑄ℎ 𝑥  𝑇𝑙𝑝)]
0.728                                                       (7.20)    
 
The term (0.001 (𝑄ℎ 𝑥  𝑇𝑙𝑝)) is the quantity of oil spilled into the ocean or the sea in 
tonnes.   
 
7.4.9 Determine Target Risk and the Expected Risk   
7.4.9.1 Establish Target Risk and Critical Risk Year 
The critical risk year is defined as the year that a pipeline segment exceeds the target risk. 
This is different than the critical failure year which is the year that the probability of failure 
exceeds the target probability of failure.   
 
The critical year (𝑌𝐶  ) will be the minimum of the critical failure years and critical risk 
years as indicated in Equation 21. The critical failure years include the critical failure year 
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due to leakage (𝑌𝐿−𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒) and the critical failure year due to burst (𝑌𝐵−𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒  ). The 
critical risk years include critical risk year due to leakage (𝑌𝐿−𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘) and critical risk year 
due to burst (𝑌 𝐵−𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘    ). 
 
𝑌𝐶  = 𝑀𝑖𝑛 [ 𝑌𝐿−𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑌𝐵−𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒,    𝑌𝐿−𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘, 𝑌 𝐵−𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘     ]                                            (7.21) 
 
In practice, the target risk is specified in accordance with the guidelines of the operating 
company that dictate the acceptable level of risk that the company can tolerate. In this 
chapter, it is assumed that the product of the maximum allowable probability of failure of 
offshore pipeline and the estimated value of the asset is used to provide the target risk.  As 
per DNV-RP-F-101, 10-4 is the   maximum allowed probability of failure for offshore 
pipelines.  
  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 =  𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑥 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡        (7.22) 
 
7.4.9.2 Determine Cost of Failure   
The cost of failure consists of all cost elements associated with environmental damage, 
production losses due to oil spill and due to shutdown of the facility for repair and facility 
repair. It should be noted that all future cost elements are driven by the interest and inflation 
rates. The environmental consequences cost (EC) is driven by the expected quantity of oil 
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spill only; the lost production cost is driven by the quantity of the oil spill and the quantity 
of the lost production due to shut down. This chapter considers that the damaged pipeline 
is replaced and   a flat rate is used to calculate the cost of inspection.    Moreover, the 
interest and inflation rates are used to calculate future cost. The real interest rate or 
sometimes is called inflation-free interest rate can be calculated as (Ayyub, 2010):  
  
𝑖∗  =   (
1+𝑖 
1+𝐼
) − 1                                                                     (7.23) 
 
𝑖∗  is the real interest rate, i is the market interest rate or nominal interest rate, and I is the 
inflation rate.  Using Equation 7.23 the FV can be estimated as:  
 
𝐹𝑉(𝑇) = 𝑃𝑉 (1 + 𝑖∗)𝑇                                                                    (7.24) 
 
FV is the future value, PV is the present value and T is the number of years. Alternatively, 
the equation can be expressed as: 
 
𝐹𝑉(𝑇) = 𝑃𝑉 (
1+𝑖 
1+𝐼
)
𝑇
                                                                               (7.25) 
 
Using Equation 7.25, the failure cost (Costfailure) at year 𝑇  can be expressed as: 
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𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒(𝑇 ) =  [𝐶𝑜𝑓 ] (
1+𝑖 
1+𝐼
)
𝑇 
                                                                                  (7.26) 
 
7.4.9.3 Calculate Risk 
Risk is the expected financial losses which is the product of joint probability of failure 
(𝑃𝑜𝑓) and the estimated cost of failure as indicated in Equation 7.27.      
    
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘(𝑇 ) = 𝑃𝑜𝑓(𝑇 ) 𝑥 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒(𝑇 )                    (7.27) 
 
7.5 CASE STUDY 
 
 Three pipeline segments, each has a length of 200 meters and each has been suffering 
corrosion. They have a mean diameter of 700 mm and wall thickness of 14 mm. The 
measured initial corrosion depth and length as well as the corrosion growth have been 
assumed to follow normal distribution.  The pipeline is equipped with a fiber optic LDS 
that has been specified to achieve a signal to noise ratio of 15 dB and PFA of 0.00025.   The 
value of the operating facility is estimated to be 100 Million dollars.  It is assumed that it 
will take four business days to realize or know with high certainty that a leakage or a burst 
has occurred.   Furthermore, it is assumed that will take seven working days to restore the 
damaged pipelines. The   maximum risk that the operating company can accept is 10,000 
Dollars.   The other details are summarized in Table 7.1.  It is required to determine the 
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critical years for the three pipeline segments based on the predicted annual probability of 
failure and expected financial losses.   
 
  
Table 7-1: Pipeline Information 
  PL1 PL2 PL3  
Variable Unit Mean CoV Mean CoV Mean CoV Distribution 
Operating Pressure Po MPa 7 0.1 7 0.1 7 0.1 Normal 
Distribution 
Ultimate Tensile 
Strength 
σU MPa 550 0.07 550 0.07 550 0.07 Normal 
Distribution 
Corrosion Depth 
Rate 
Vcr mm/yr 0.3 0.033 0.4 0.0075 0.6 0.067 Normal 
Distribution 
Pipe Diameter D mm 700 0.029 700 0.029 700 0.029 Normal 
Distribution 
Pipe Wall Thickness t mm 14 0.005 14 0.005 14 0.005 Normal 
Distribution 
Initial Corrosion 
Depth 
do mm 4 0.25 5 0.16 5.5 0.16 Normal 
Distribution 
Initial Corrosion 
Length 
Lo mm 500 0.02 400 0.01 600 0.009 Normal 
Distribution 
  
The corrosion flaw details, the pipeline and the LDS relevant details are illustrated in 
Figure 7.1. 
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Figure 7-1: Pipeline Segments and Corrosion Flaw Details 
 
7.6  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 Matlab codes have been developed to run Monte Carlo simulation to generate simulated 
values of the random variables, and these values are used to compute the limit state 
function.  In this study, 2x105 simulation cycles were used to run the simulation. The initial 
step in the analysis was to estimate the expected cumulative corrosion growth as indicated 
in Figures 7.2 and 7.3. These figures illustrate the expected corrosion depth and length over 
time respectively.   
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Figure 7-2: Cumulative Corrosion Depth Versus Time 
  
Figure 7.2 indicates that the third segment is the worst among the three segments. As per 
DNV-RP-F101, a pipeline that has a corrosion depth exceeding 85% of the wall thickness 
is considered unsafe for operation. Hence, this will be considered as the critical corrosion 
depth. The Figure indicates that the third segment exceeds the critical corrosion (85% of 
the wall thickness) at the 12th year, the second segment at the 17th year and the first segment 
at the 27th year. Similarly, Figure 7.3 shows that the corrosion length growth for the third 
segment is the worst segment among the three segments. The figure reveals that the second 
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segment has the lowest cumulative corrosion length because it has the lowest initial defect 
length among the three pipeline segments.   
 
Figure 7-3: Cumulative Corrosion Length Versus Time 
 
The next step in the  analysis was to compute the limit state functions from which the 
probability of failures is computed for the two failure events, failure due to leakage and 
failure due to burst.  The joint failure events are considered, failure of the pipeline and the 
LDS. The LDS threshold can be calculated using Equation 7.14 to yield 3.5σ, assuming 
standard deviation of the measurements to be 0.7 °C, then the threshold will be 2.5 °C;  
using Equation 7.15, the PMD is estimated to be 0.016.   
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The probability of failure plots for the three pipelines are illustrated in figures 7.4 and 7.5 
respectively. Figure 7.4 illustrates the probability of leakage failure over time. As the 
Figure illustrates that, the probability of failure is increasing due to the increase of 
corrosion over time. Moreover, the Figure reveals that the third pipeline segment has the 
worst probability of failure, exceeding the target probability of failure at year 7.  The first 
and the second pipeline segments exceed the target probability of failure at year 18 and 12 
respectively.  
 
 
Figure 7-4: Pipelines Probability of Leakage Failure 
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Figure 7.5 illustrates the burst probability of failure for the three pipeline segments. The 
figure indicates that the third pipeline segment has the worst probability of failure 
exceeding the target probability of failure at year 4. The other pipeline segments, 
segments 1 and 2 exceed the target probability of failure at year 11.5 and 7.9 respectively.  
 
 
  
Figure 7-5: Pipelines Probability of Burst Failure 
 
The estimated leak rate for the three Pipeline segments can be calculated using Equation 
7.17 to yield the results indicated in Figure 7.6. The figure illustrates the expected leak rate 
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corrosion flaw stayed without being repaired. The figure indicates that the third pipeline 
segment has the highest expected leak rate due to the fact that this segment has the highest 
corrosion growth rate and has the highest initial corrosion length. The second pipeline 
segment has the lowest expected leak rate as this segment has the lowest initial corrosion 
length.  
 
 
 
Figure 7-6: Estimated Leak Rate 
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Using Equation 7.22 the target risk is estimated to be 10,000 Dollars. Figure 7.7 illustrates 
the expected risk as a result of leakage failure over time for the three pipeline segments. 
The Figure reveals that the 1st pipeline segment exceeds the target risk at   year 17,   the 
second segment at   year 12.25 and the third pipeline at   year 6.8.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-7: Expected Financial Losses Due to Leakage Failure 
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Figure 7.8 illustrates the expected risk due to burst failure over time for the three pipeline 
segments. The Figure reveals that the 1st pipeline segment exceeds the target risk at the 
year 11,   the second segment at year 8 and the third pipeline at year 4.   
 
 
Figure 7-8: Expected Financial Losses Due to Burst Failure 
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target risk and is the worst among the three segments in terms of the expected financial 
losses due to either leakage or burst failure.  
 
Table 7-2: Critical Years for the Three Pipeline Segments 
 
As per the information presented in the table, it is recommended that the third pipeline 
segment should be replaced at year 4, while the first and the second segments should be 
replaced at years 11 and 8 respectively.   
 
7.7  SUMMARY  
 
Risk assessment methodology for offshore pipelines has been presented. The methodology 
has been used to determine the level of risk or the expected financial losses as a result of 
pipeline and LDS joint failures. Furthermore, the methodology has been applied to 
determine the critical failure and the critical risk years, from which the critical year for the 
asset being evaluated can be determined. 
 
 
Pipeline Segments Leakage Failure Burst Failure Critical Year 
  Critical  
Failure Year 
Critical  Risk  
Year 
Critical  
Failure Year 
Critical  Risk  
Year 
 
PL1 18 17 11.8 11 11 
PL2 12 12.25 8 8 8 
PL3 7 6.8 4 4 4 
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CHAPTER 8  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
An integrated probabilistic assessment framework for assessing oil and gas transport 
systems and their condition monitoring systems has been developed. The focus of the 
research was on a fiber-optic-based leak detection system (LDS). Four major tasks were 
undertaken to accomplish the objectives of the research: 1) formulation of the probability 
of detection and false detection for a fiber-optic-based LDS, 2) development of a 
probabilistic performance assessment scheme for a fiber-optic-based LDS, 3) application 
of probabilistic methods for assessing the integrity and determining the probability of 
failure as well as the remaining life of an oil and gas transport component (i.e., the 
pipeline), and 4) development of a risk-based assessment methodology to determine the 
risk associated with the simultaneous failure of the LDS and the oil and gas pipeline. 
 
The last task resulted in a joint probabilistic assessment approach for corroded pipelines 
and the LDS to provide a thorough and accurate assessment of the integrity of the pipeline 
and the performance of the LDS. The joint probability of failure for both the pipeline and 
the LDS encompasses both the failure of the pipeline and the failure of the detection 
system. The overall probability of failure for the LDS consists mainly of two failures; 
namely, detection failure and false detection. Probability of false detection was evaluated 
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separately as its consequences are different from those associated with detection failure. 
The consequences of false detection only include the deployment of equipment and 
personnel to the site thought to be affected; however, such consequences have insignificant 
financial losses and thus can be neglected. The consequences of detection failure take place 
only when an actual leak occurs and causes environmental damage; the effect of the 
ensuing production losses is very significant.  
 
Under this research, a probability-based assessment approach was adopted as it is the best 
suited to deal with uncertainty. This research used probabilistic methods to quantify the 
magnitude of uncertainty and variability inherent in the parameters that govern the 
performance of the systems that are under study.  It is evident from the analysis, that using 
probabilistic methods provided results that are more certain and accurate. Sometimes, 
systems might be so complex and have significant uncertainties inherent in the governing 
variables.   To tackle such a problem is to use probabilistic methods in conjunction with 
Monte Carlo simulation.  These methods can provide all possible outcomes of the problem 
being analyzed. Furthermore, they allow researchers to explore and predict the behavior of 
the system more easily.   Using deterministic methods may not provide accurate results 
because they considers only one point estimate of the parameters that are under study.   
 
A summary and concluding remarks for each research topic are discussed in the following 
sections. 
190 
 
 
 
 
 
8.1. Leak Detection Systems’ Probability of Detection and False Detection    
 
The PD and the PFA were formulated for a fiber-optic-based LDS. These parameters form 
the fundamental building blocks for assessing the performance of the LDS. The analysis 
revealed that as the SNR increases, the PD and PFA also increase. The simultaneous 
increase of the PD and the PFA presents a great challenge when designing or specifying 
the system. Furthermore, the analysis showed a direct relationship between the parameters; 
in other words, the PD increases with the increase of PFA. To address this challenge, an 
acceptable PFA should first be selected from which a satisfactory threshold can be 
determined. Once the threshold is established, the PD can be immediately determined.  
 
Missed detection and false detection are detrimental to the system performance, and the 
consequences of their occurrence cost time and money. The question is which one is more 
costly; obviously, the consequences of missed detection will result in a greater financial 
burden than the consequences of false detection. Therefore, the initial step in designing 
such systems is to determine the magnitude of risk that the operators can accept and tolerate 
in the event a missed detection takes place. Once this step has been accomplished, the 
performance parameters can easily be established.  
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8.2  Probabilistic Performance Assessment of Fiber Optic Leak Detection Systems 
 
A probabilistic performance assessment scheme based on limit state approach for the entire 
fiber optic LDS has been developed. The probabilistic assessment outcome includes the 
probability of failure for the entire LDS along the pipeline. In addition, the response time 
for the entire LDS along the pipeline was provided as part of the assessment. Essentially, 
this topic demonstrated how the limit state approach can be used to calculate the probability 
of failure (probability of missed detection) for fiber-optic-based LDS.  
 
Monte Carlo simulation technique was applied to calculate the probability of failures using 
sample statistics and counting methods. Matlab codes were developed and used to 
implement the methodology and run the simulations. 
 
The consequences of LDS detection failure are different than those of false detection, and 
therefore they are calculated separately. The latter causes oil spills that require the 
mobilization of full crew and equipment and other required resources required for cleanup 
and repair. The false detection only requires the mobilization of the crew to the site and no 
work is required as there is no actual leak or oil spill. Knowing the probability of failures 
beforehand will assist operators to prepare in advance and allocate the required resources 
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for such incidents. Having prior knowledge about what could happen in the case of a failure 
will minimize downtime and enhance production during these situations.  
  
The limit state equations were formulated on the assumption that the capacity and load are 
probabilistic as they are affected by varying operational demands and environmental 
conditions. We found that the sample statistics technique and the counting method for 
calculating the probability of failure almost produce the same results.  
 
8.3 Application of Probabilistic Methods for Assessing the Integrity of Offshore 
Pipelines   
 
A methodology for determining the probability of failure and the remaining life of aging 
pipelines has been developed. The assessment was conducted using limit state approach to 
calculate the probability of failure. Two limit state functions (LSF) were formulated. The 
first defines the difference between the critical corrosion depth and the measured corrosion 
depth at a given point in time. The second expresses the pressure change, which is the 
difference between the two pressures (burst pressure and operating pressure). Monte Carlo 
simulation technique was applied to calculate the probability of failures and determine the 
remaining life of the pipeline. Matlab codes were developed and used to implement the 
methodology and run the simulations. The methodology adopted the models presented in 
DNV-RP-F101/BS-7910 and ASME-B31G. The results indicated that the difference in the 
estimated remaining life is fairly close. The analysis showed that the estimated remaining 
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life based on the corrosion LSF and the DNV/BS failure pressure LSF are similar. 
Moreover, the combined failure probability analysis indicated that ASME modified method 
is less conservative than the DNV approach. From the study it was concluded that the 
ASME B31G effective area method is the most conservative method. 
 
The differences in these models are attributed mainly to the different approaches for 
calculating the area of flaw or defect shapes, the diameter of the pipe considered, and 
whether tensile strength or yield strength is used. For example, DNV-RP-F101 Part B and 
BS-7910 models consider the nominal diameter (D-t) while the ASME model considers the 
outer diameter (D). DNV-RP-F101 Part B, BS-7910, and ASME B31G effective area 
method use a rectangular shape for the flaw (dL) while the modified ASME B31G model 
uses 0.85(dL); where d is the flaw depth and L is the flaw length. DNV-RP-F101 Part B 
and BS-7910 use ultimate strength while ASME uses yield strength. In short, the difference 
arises from the usage of different models in these standards. 
 
8.4 Risk Assessment of Offshore Crude Oil Pipeline Failure   
 
Risk assessment methodology for offshore pipelines has been presented. The methodology 
is used to determine the level of risk or the expected financial losses due to the joint failure 
of the pipelines and the LDS. Chapters 6 and 7 were dedicated to discussing this topic. 
Chapter 6 presented a methodology to assess risk due to LDS failure and pipeline rupture 
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failure only, while chapter 7 presented a methodology to assess risk due to LDS failure and 
pipeline rupture and leakage failures. Time dependent degradation mechanism, such as 
corrosion, is one of the main causes of pipeline failure; it weakens the pipeline leading to 
two possible failure events, leak or rupture. When corrosion penetrates the entire thickness 
of the pipeline wall, a leak failure occurs. The operating pressure exceeds the maximum 
allowed pressure or the burst pressure at the corrosion flaw point, which causes a burst or 
large leak failure.  
 
Limit state approach was used to determine the probability of failure due to corrosion, 
which was derived as the difference between the critical corrosion depth and the measured 
corrosion depth at time T. Likewise, limit state approach was used to determine the 
probability of failure due to burst pressure.  
 
The LDS probability of failure was derived in terms of probability of false alarm. It was 
assumed as part of the LDS specification that either the probability of false alarm or the 
threshold is a given parameter. From the threshold the probability of false alarm can be 
determined and from this value the probability of detection and missed detection can be   
determined. Detection failure takes place only when there is an actual leak happening and 
the LDS fails to detect it (and the leak is assumed to be an independent failure event from 
that of the pipeline). The joint probability of failure, which encompasses the pipeline failure 
and the detection failure, was used to determine the overall probability of failure.  
195 
 
 
 
 
Risk was defined as the product of the joint probability and consequences of failure for the 
LDS and pipeline. Failure consequences, consist of economic and environmental damages 
estimated in monetary value.   The economic consequences comprise the repair cost and 
the financial losses due to lost and deferred oil production. The environmental 
consequences comprise socioeconomic consequences, oil spill cleanup, and environmental 
damage repair. It is of great interest for oil and gas operators to know in advance the 
expected level of risk in the event the system fails so that they can be better prepared to 
deal with such failure incidents. Furthermore, having prior knowledge of the expected level 
of risk enables financial planners to allocate the required capital and resources to cover the 
costs associated with the consequences of failure. Examples were presented that illustrated 
the application of the methodology.   
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CHAPTER 9  
CONTRIBUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
The developed assessment framework is a very useful tool to assess and predict the 
integrity of oil and gas transport components, i.e., pipelines, and the reliability of the LDS. 
Moreover, the assessment provides an estimate of the level of risk associated with the 
failure of these systems.   
 
This framework can be considered as one of the key elements of the oil and gas asset 
integrity management system. It can be easily implemented by integrating it with the 
periodic or preventive maintenance programs to assess the integrity of the systems and 
determine what courses of action are necessary to enhance the performance of the evaluated 
systems.  
 
The focus of this research was on the oil and gas transport component and the leak detection 
system, which can be extended to include pressure equipment, vessels, tanks, and other 
components of oil and gas infrastructure. Moreover, this research can be extended to 
include active components such as pumps, compressors, etc. Section 9.1 summarize the 
contributions of this research and section 9.2 recommends avenues for future research.  
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9.1 CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
 9.1.1 Performance Assessment of Fiber-Optic-Based LDS  
 
9.1.1.1  Probability of detection and false detection  
 
There is a need to have a reliable and effective condition monitoring system, such as LDS, 
to provide assurances that the monitored pipeline is safe and functioning as per operating 
conditions. Hence, the behavior of the monitoring system should be assessed frequently 
and the assessment should take into consideration the probabilistic nature of the system. 
Moreover, there is no established method for evaluating the PD and PFA for fiber-optic-
based LDS. The missed detection and false detection are both detrimental to system 
performance, and thus it is essential to know these two parameters beforehand to be better 
prepared to deal with failure situations and able to minimize the impact of the failure. As a 
result, this research was undertaken in order to formulate these two parameters to establish 
the framework for assessing the performance of the LDS, which was addressed in the 
chapter 3 (first research topic) and chapter 4 (second research topic). Undoubtedly, 
knowing how the system behaves will assist operators in implementing the most 
appropriate course of action that might be required to enhance system reliability and ensure 
better preparedness to minimize the consequences of its failure. The research outcomes 
include mathematical models to calculate: 
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 Probability of detection 
 Probability of missed detection 
 Probability of false alarm 
 Minimum detectable temperature change  
  
9.1.1.2 Probabilistic Performance Assessment of Fiber-Optic-Based Leak Detection 
Systems  
Chapter 4 extended the limit state approach, which is traditionally applied to structural 
assessment, to instrumentation, i.e., LDS, to determine the probability of detection failure 
for a fiber-optic-based LDS. Detection failure combines two failure events, missed 
detection and delayed detection. The assessment established a probabilistic scheme 
incorporating the randomness and variability inherent in the performance parameters. In 
essence, the outcome of the assessment provided the overall probability of failure for the 
entire LDS along the pipeline as well as response time and accuracy. The research 
outcomes include mathematical models based on limit state approach to calculate: 
 
 Probability of detection failure for the entire LDS along the pipeline 
 Probability of false alarm from the entire LDS along the pipeline 
 Response time 
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9.1.2  Application of Probabilistic Methods for Assessing the Integrity of Offshore 
Pipelines   
Uncertainty in the data pertaining to pipeline geometry, pipeline material properties, 
pipeline inspection, and operating characteristics present a great challenge to the analysis. 
Moreover, the codes and standards used for assessing pipeline integrity follow a 
deterministic approach for calculating the different parameters. Considering these 
challenges, efforts have been undertaken by this research to develop and introduce a 
probability-based assessment approach to deal with the aforementioned challenges and to 
determine the probability of failure for the pipeline (chapter 5). The pipeline probability of 
failure can be used as a measure to determine the fitness of the pipeline for service and 
determine its remaining life when compared against a target probability of failure. The 
research outcomes include: 
 A probabilistic model for determining the annual probability of failure and 
assessing the remnant life of aging subsea pipelines. This model can be used to 
determine the allowable life extension without compromising safety and 
reliability.  
 
 Comparative study of the remnant assessment models (using corrosion and burst 
pressure) as presented in selected codes and standards, i.e., ASME, DNV, and BS. 
 
 Uncertainty and variability in the input data and model are reduced through 
Monte Carlo simulation and probabilistic methods. 
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 9.1.3  Risk-Based Methodology for Assessing Offshore Pipeline Condition 
Monitoring Systems 
 
The failure of the LDS to detect hydrocarbon releases from an offshore pipeline can have 
devastating effects on the operation and environment. Moreover, the failure consequences 
may bring about excessive financial losses and could threaten the survivability of the 
operating company in the market. 
 
It is therefore crucial that operating companies continually conduct risk-based assessments 
of the integrity and operability of their pipeline network to ensure they do not pose any 
threat to the continuity of oil flow.  
 
In light of the above, an integrated risk-based assessment approach for offshore pipelines 
and LDS was developed in this research. This approach can be used to predict and quantify 
the future financial impact in the event a pipeline or condition monitoring system (i.e., 
LDS) fails. The assessment provides the expected level of risk expressed in monetary 
value. Knowing the level of risk beforehand enables operating companies to allocate the 
required financial resources to cover the unexpected future financial losses that may result 
from the failure of a process component. The research outcomes include: 
 A probabilistic model for determining the annual probability of failure of the 
pipeline based on thinning (corrosion) damage. 
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 The overall risk in terms of the probability and consequences of failure. 
 An economic-based risk assessment. 
9.2 FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
9.2.1 Probability of Detection and False Detection for Fiber-Optic-Based LDS 
 
This research was limited to fiber-optic-based LDS. Future research should be extended to 
include other types of LDS, such as negative pressure, pressure point, volume balance, and 
real time transient methods. In addition, fiber-optic-based LDS that use other sensing 
techniques, such as Raman, can be investigated in future research. Performing 
experimental work in a lab setting would provide different approaches to the development 
of the probability of detection and false detection models. Furthermore, the experimentally 
developed models can be compared against the theoretically developed models, which can 
provide a deep and thoughtful understanding of the probability of detection and false 
detection.  
 
9.2.2 Probabilistic Performance Assessment of Fiber-Optic–Based LDS 
 
This research developed a probabilistic performance assessment scheme based on limit 
state approach for the entire fiber-optic LDS. Similarity may exist between this research 
topic and the previous research topic, but they address two different subjects. The first topic 
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provided the formulation of the PD and the PFA, and this topic tries to determine these two 
parameters using the limit state approach. Essentially, this topic demonstrates how the limit 
state approach can be used to calculate the probability of failure (probability of missed 
detection) for fiber-optic-based LDS. Furthermore, the LDS response time and probability 
of delayed detection were developed. This research was limited to fiber-optic-based LDS 
used for monitoring pipelines; investigating the detection of hydrocarbon leakage from 
vessels and tanks in addition to pipelines would open the door for a wider spectrum of 
applications.  
 
9.2.3 Application of Probabilistic Methods for Assessing the Integrity of Offshore 
Pipelines 
Under this research topic, a probabilistic methodology was developed to assess the integrity 
of a pipeline and determine its probability of failure as well as its remaining life.  The study 
considered only one damage mechanism which s corrosion, future research can extend this 
work to include other damage mechanism such cracks and other time-independent 
mechanisms such as third-party inference, geo-hazards,  and operational as well as 
construction errors. Moreover, future research can extend this work to perform level III 
analysis using the Finite Element Method to obtain more insight and understanding of the 
failure models. This will enable practitioners to determine the most accurate model that 
needs to be considered in the evaluation.  
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9.2.4 Risk Assessment of Offshore Crude Oil Pipeline Failure Due to Rupture 
 
A methodology was developed to assess the risk associated with the simultaneous failure 
of the LDS and offshore pipelines. The focus was on the failure due to rupture only, which 
occurs as a result of corrosion. Future research could be extended to include rupture failure 
resulting from accidental impact with foreign objects hitting the pipelines.  
 
9.2.5 Risk Assessment of Offshore Pipeline Rupture and Leakage Failure 
 
A methodology was developed to assess the risk associated with the simultaneous failure 
of the LDS and offshore pipelines, with a focus on failure due to rupture and leakage that 
may occur as a result of corrosion. Future research can be extended to include failures 
resulting from third-party interference, sabotage, or geo-hazard incidents. Moreover, 
extension of this work to include assessment of onshore as well as arctic pipelines is 
recommended. 
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